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ABSTRACT
ECONOMIC VOTING AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE POINTS
MELEK HİLAL EROĞLU
POLITICAL SCIENCE M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. MERT MORAL
Keywords: Economic Voting, Substitutive Nature of Reference Points, Elections,
Opponent Strength, Polarization
This thesis examines the substitutive nature of the effects of relative domestic and
international economic growth on incumbent vote share by using an extended cross-
national dataset. The findings suggest that the positive marginal effect of relative
domestic growth (international growth) on incumbent vote share is stronger when
relative international growth (domestic growth) is lower. In other words, the use
of domestic and international reference points by incumbents varies depending on
the relative importance of these reference points. An equally important question
this thesis seeks to answer is whether opponent party strength and ideological diver-
gence between the opponent and the incumbent party are significant determinants
of incumbent support. The empirical analyses suggest that opponent strength and
party polarization have significant effects on incumbent vote share, but only after
passing some threshold and for some particular economic conditions. Moreover, I
check the validity of my findings from cross-national analyses in a case study on
Turkey by employing individual-level data. The main findings from the in-depth
case study reveal that partisan attitudes formed in the early political socialization
process rather than economic evaluations determine voters’ party preferences. On
the other hand, economic evaluations have a positive and significant impact on in-
cumbent vote for voters with weak partisan attachment to the AK Party. However,
since the number of those people is very small, we cannot talk about a substantive
significance of economic evaluations on incumbent vote.
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ÖZET
EKONOMİK OY VERME VE YURT İÇİ VE ULUSLARARASI REFERANS
NOKTALARININ GÖRECELİ ÖNEMİ
MELEK HİLAL EROĞLU
SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Mert Moral
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomik Oy Verme, Referans Noktalarının İkame Edici
Niteliği, Seçimler, Rakip Parti Gücü, Kutuplaşma
Bu tez genişletilmiş bir veri seti kullanarak göreceli iç ve dış ekonomik büyümenin
çeşitli ülkelerdeki hükümet partilerinin oy oranları üzerindeki etkilerinin ikame edici
niteliğini incelemektedir. Bulgular nispi yurt içi ekonomik büyümenin (uluslararası
büyüme) hükümet partisi oy oranı üzerindeki pozitif marjinal etkisinin nispi ulus-
lararası büyüme (yurt içi büyüme) düşük iken en yüksek olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.
Başka bir deyişle, iç ve dış referans noktalarının hükümet partisince kullanımı bu
referans noktalarının nispi önemine göre değişmektedir. Bu tezin cevap vermeye
çalıştığı önemli bir diğer soru ise rakip parti gücü ve hükümet partisi ile rakip parti
arasındaki ideolojik ayrışmanın hükümet partisi desteğinin önemli belirleyicileri olup
olmadığıdır. Ampirik analizler, rakibin gücünün ve parti kutuplaşmasının hükümet
partisi oy oranı üzerinde önemli etkilerinin olduğunu ancak bu etkinin ancak bir
takım eşikleri geçtiğinde ve bazı özel ekonomik koşullarda geçerli olduğunu ileri
sürmektedir. İlaveten, uluslararası analizlerden gelen bulguların geçerliliği bireysel
düzeyde veri kullanılarak Türkiye üzerine bir vaka çalışmasında kontrol edilmekte-
dir. Derinlemesine vaka çalışmasının ana bulguları ekonomik değerlendirmeler yerine
erken siyasal sosyalleşme sürecinde şekillenen partizan tutumların seçmenlerin parti
tercihlerini belirlediğini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Öte yandan, AK Parti’ye partizan
bağları görece zayıf seçmenlerin ekonomik değerlendirmelerinin oy davranışlarına
olumlu ve önemli bir etkisi olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır. Fakat bu kişilerin sayısı
çok az olduğu için ekonomik değerlendirmelerin hükümet partisi oy oranı üzerindeki
etkisine dair istatistiki olarak anlamlı bir çıkarım yapılamamıştır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The economic voting literature has been largely expanding and reached about 600
published works according to a rough estimate (Lewis-Beck and Lobo 2017, 606).
A large amount of empirical studies in literature agree on that economy plays an
important role in elections in democracies around the world. Economic voting is
accepted as one of the most significant indicators of democracy since it reveals a
control mechanism over elected officials by people (Kayser and Peress 2012, 663). For
an effective functioning of electoral accountability, the economic voting is necessary
such that voters systematically punish (reward) incumbents for weak (satisfactory)
national economic outcomes (Kayser and Peress 2012, 662).
Despite our assumption that the presence of electoral accountability, empirical re-
search often shows an unstable relationship between economic performance and
incumbent vote (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Dorussen and Palmer 2002; Pal-
dam 1991). The effect of economic conditions on incumbent vote share is observed
only occasionally and the magnitude of this effect is often found as weak (Duch
and Stevenson 2008; Fiorina 1981). This weak effect is explained through different
contexts in which whether political and institutional accountability for economic
outcomes are clearly defined, which is a sine qua non for voters to hold governments
responsible for economic outcomes (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer
1999; Samuels and Hellwig 2010; Royed, Leyden, and Borrelli 2000). However,
although political and institutional contexts are taken into account, the referred re-
lationship is still noted as an unstable one across different contexts and time periods
(Anderson 2007; Dalton and Anderson 2011).
As a result, the aim of this thesis is to depict a clearer picture of economic voting.
In order to shed light on economic voting theory, I will test alternative explanations,
which emphasize the substitutive nature of domestic and international economic out-
comes, and analyze the conditional effects of relative economic measures, opponent
strength, and polarization on incumbent vote share by using a macro-level, cross-
national dataset, and by digging deeper and checking the validity of my findings
from cross-national analysis in a case study on Turkey and employing micro-level
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data.
The previous economic voting literature emphasizing the importance of domestic
and international reference points voters employ in evaluating incumbents’ economic
performance does not refer to the substitutive nature of these reference points. How-
ever, the theoretical expectation is that incumbents emphasize the better aspect of
their economic performance especially when the difference between within-country
and cross-national comparisons of economic growth is substantial since voters are
expected to reward incumbents who present relatively better economic performance
(Aytaç 2018 16-7).
Empirical findings provide evidence for the substitutive nature of relative domes-
tic and international economic performance. In other words, incumbents’ strategy
to stress upon which reference point (domestic and international) prior to elec-
tions varies depending on which implies higher economic performance. My findings
suggest that the positive marginal effect of relative domestic growth (international
growth) on incumbent vote share is stronger when relative international growth (do-
mestic growth) is lower. The broader significance of these findings is that they help
increase our understanding of rational actions of political elites.
A very recent study on economic voting in which the effects of relative domestic and
international economic outcomes on incumbent vote are differentiated for the first
time notes that voters use two reference points, domestic and international, to assess
whether the given economic outcome is good or bad (Aytaç 2018, 17). Therefore,
my expectation that incumbents choose to emphasize their better performance on
domestic and international fronts to be rewarded in elections rests on the recent
literature. Consequently, this thesis also provides a more nuanced explanation for
the so-called reference theory in economic voting.
Furthermore, no study directly looks at the relationship between opponent strength
and polarization, and economic vote. Earlier studies suggest that the existence of a
reliable alternative party is important for economic voting (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım
2018, 177) which has not been tested. Curiously, most research on the effects of
polarization on turnout does not aim to explain incumbent vote share (e.g., Aldrich
1993; Geys 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Rogowski 2014). Therefore,
the question of whether the opponent party strength and ideological divergence
between the opponent and incumbent parties are significant determinants of voting
for the incumbent appears worthy of consideration. Empirical findings support
my expectation that in bad economic conditions voters do tend to vote against
incumbent parties when opponent strength is higher. Moreover, in order to vote
against incumbent parties, ideological positions of the incumbent and that of the
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major opponent party are needed to be taken into account. When they both stand
on the same side of the ideological continuum and when the opponent is strong, we
observe voters punishing the incumbent. These findings also have implications for
over understanding of economic voting by providing alternative explanations that
affect how of economic voting works at the individual level.
An equally important question this thesis seeks to answer is whether individuals’
economic evaluations affect vote preferences. Even though the economic voting liter-
ature on Turkey has been rapidly growing in the last decades, previous studies have
failed to clearly explain when and how voters vote against incumbent parties when
economic conditions are poor. By using individual-level data on the two most recent
Turkish general elections, I demonstrate how the effect of the economic evaluations
on vote choices might have been underestimated in the previous literature. Even
after incumbent party affiliation and demographic factors are controlled for, the im-
pact of economic evaluations on incumbent vote is found as statistically significant.
The findings are noteworthy in showing that Turkish voters who place themselves
at around the midpoint of the ideological space and its left can and, indeed, do hold
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) accountable. Those electorates tend
to reward (punish) incumbent parties when they evaluate the state of economy has
gotten better (worse). However, the substantive significance of these findings will
be discussed in detailed. Such broad implication of the individual-level analyses in
my case study should, however, be considered tentative given the lack of available
long-term survey, and preferably panel data on Turkey.
Overall, the previous literature does not provide clear explanations for when and in
which context economic voting is stronger. Furthermore, economic voting has little
to say about the electoral response to a situation where only one of the relative eco-
nomic measures (domestic or international) presents relatively good performance.
Therefore, how voters respond to the contrasting domestic and international eco-
nomic outcomes, if any, in elections, and when and in which political and institu-
tional context the effect of economic conditions is stronger and positive, are the key
questions motivating this research.
In order to answer these crucially important questions informed by previous litera-
ture, this thesis merges data from several sources. An extended macro-level cross-
national dataset covering 501 presidential and parliamentary elections in a total of
63 countries between 1960 and 2017 is employed in the second chapter. Moreover,
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two individual-level survey data, CSES Modules 41 and 52, collected shortly after
the June 2015 and June 2018 Turkish general elections and conducted with 1062
respondents in total, are used in the third chapter. The CSES data include a num-
ber of questions that make it suitable for measuring voters’ economic evaluations,
partisanship, ideological distance to the incumbent, and other relevant demographic
factors influencing their vote decision-making.
This thesis consists of two empirical chapters. The next chapter first defines and
reviews the relevant literature on economic voting. After providing the theoretical
framework for the comparative analysis on economic voting by explaining the substi-
tutive nature of relative domestic and international economic outcomes along with
the effects of opponent strength and polarization on the incumbent vote share in
detail, I introduce the hypotheses derived from the theory. Then, I explain the data
and methods used throughout the comparative analysis part. The fourth subsection
of chapter two discusses the results of empirical analyses. I conclude the second
chapter by discussing the findings and their implications.
Beginning with the first section of the third chapter, an empirical analysis of the
electoral behavior in Turkish parliamentary elections employing survey dataset will
be presented. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings from the economic
voting perspective, discusses the limitations of this thesis, and presents a road-map
for further research.
1The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data, Module 4 Full Release (May 29, 2018),
https://cses.org/data-download/module-4-2011-2016/
2The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data, Module 5 First Advance Release (May 21, 2019),
https://cses.org/data-download/cses-module-5-2016-2021/
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2. ECONOMIC VOTING AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE POINTS
In this comparative analysis chapter, I examine the relationship between economic
outcomes and the incumbent support within the domestically and internationally
comparative frameworks. I argue that politicians emphasize the better aspect of
their economic performance among within-country and cross-national comparisons
since voters reward incumbents who present relatively better economic performance.
For instance, before France’s presidential run-off in 2012, the two candidates, in-
cumbent Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist challenger Francois Hollande, appeared on
television. Mr. Sarkozy answered questions about his competence in managing the
economy by stressing on the positive economic performance of France compared to
other European and OECD countries. In the same way, Turkish president Erdoğan’s
references to the period before his first term in office are to highlight domestic eco-
nomic performance of his government as better.
As rational actors, politicians decide to emphasize domestic or international eco-
nomic growth by looking at the national and cross-national comparisons. Incum-
bents stress on the better aspect of their economic performance especially when
the difference between within-country and cross-national comparisons of economic
growth is substantial. Similarly, opponents stress the worse economic outcomes in
domestic and international comparisons during the incumbency term. This argu-
ment underlines two different comparison mechanisms in understanding the rela-
tionship between economic outcomes and support for incumbent: the first is using a
domestic and international comparative framework whereas the second is comparing
domestic and international economic outcomes.
This research aims to increase our understanding of the rational actions of politi-
cians. Politicians’ aim is to win elections and the conventional wisdom suggests
that the effect of positive retrospective evaluations on incumbent’s economic perfor-
mance is crucially important for the reelection. Accordingly, incumbents highlight
their best performance among domestic or international comparisons. Voters eval-
uate the current economy as good or poor based on highlighted reference points
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by politicians. This argument rests on the recent literature, which states that in-
cumbents with relatively better economic records in the domestic and international
comparisons will be rewarded, whereas relatively poor economic outcomes in domes-
tic and international comparisons will be punished in elections (Aytaç 2018, 16-7).
This argument reveals the research question of this study. What is the importance of
substitutive nature of domestic and international economic growth, in other words,
the reference points, on the electoral outcomes of incumbent party/leader? Under
specific conditions in which domestic economic growth is higher than international
economic growth, for instance, the effect of domestic growth on incumbent vote
share will be substantively more significant.
In this first empirical chapter, first, I will define and review the relevant literature
on economic voting. Second, I will explain my argument on the substitutive nature
of relative domestic and international economic growth along with the effects of
opponent strength and polarization on incumbent vote share in detail. Then, I will
introduce the hypotheses derived from the theory. Further, I will discuss the results
of the empirical analyses through the theoretical perspective introduced in previous
sections. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the importance of substitutive na-
ture of reference points and the significance of the effects of opponent strength and
polarization on incumbent vote share.
2.1 Literature Review
The conventional wisdom is that there is a relationship between the electoral fortune
of the incumbent party and the change in economic conditions. Does this link really
exist? To what extent economic policies of a government affect voting behavior?
The first systematic analysis of these questions was conducted by Kramer in 1971
(Kramer 1971). He found that real income and inflation impact aggregate vote
shares, but unemployment does not (Fiorina 1978, 427). The first attack against
Kramer was brought by an economist, Stigler, in 1973 (Fiorina 1978, 427) through
his rejection of the so-called retrospective economic voting model, which suggests
that incumbents prosper in good and suffer in bad times (Fiorina 1978, 427-428).
Stigler argues that voting in response to economic matters might be policy-oriented
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 134) as contrary to retrospective voting, which presumes
that citizens look to outcomes rather than policies themselves (Fiorina 1978, 430).
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Since the studies of Kramer (1971) and Stigler (1973), a large number of studies
supporting both approaches were conducted (Fiorina 1978, 428). However, in the
first empirical chapter of this thesis, I will mostly focus on studies indicating that
electoral outcomes are driven by economic fluctuations.
Fiorina (1978) investigates the macro-level relationship between election outcomes
and economic conditions at the individual level. He finds, on average, no impact
of personal economic conditions on electoral outcomes, but some support “for some
types of election at some particular times” (Fiorina 1978, 440). The personal eco-
nomic grievances’ effect on voting behavior is called pocketbook voting. It assumes
that citizens who are worried about their pocketbooks tend to support candidates
and parties that have benefited to their economic gains (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981,
130). Similarly, in the “American Voter” (Campell et al. 1960), it is asserted that
policy preferences reflect primitive self-interest (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 131).
That is to say that pocketbook politics reflect economic self-interest. However, the
empirical analysis in Kinder and Kiewiet’s (1981, 144) study indicates that the effect
of personal economic grievances on voting preferences is not statistically significant,
but sociotropic judgments, which is defined as ‘citizens’ assessments of the nation’s
economic predicament” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 130), are related to congres-
sional voting (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 135). Similarly to the distinction between
pocketbook and sociotropic voting, another model in the literature distinguishes
retrospective and prospective voting. MacKuen and his colleagues (1992, 597) de-
fine retrospective economic voter as peasants “who base [their] expectations solely
on recent economic performance or personal economic experience” and prospective
voter as the banker “who incorporates new information about the future into per-
sonal economic expectations”. The question they ask is to what extent political
judgments are led by experienced personal economic conditions and expectations
about a nation’s economic future (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992, 597). The
findings suggest that the source of current changes in presidential approval lies in
the immediate economic future, not in the past (Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson
1992, 606). This finding might lead to many interesting future research opportu-
nities about strategic behavior of political actors in convincing the electorate that
the economy will improve in order to not lose their electoral support. This is a very
intriguing idea for this thesis as well and constitutes theoretical underpinnings of my
argument on the relative importance of economic reference points, which I explain
below in detail.
Gomez and Wilson (2001), on the other hand, make a contribution to the pock-
etbook/sociotropic voting literature by stressing on political sophistication. Their
findings indicate that pocketbook voting is common among sophisticated voters be-
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cause they can make distal associations between their personal economic conditions
and governmental policy (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 899), contrary to unsophisti-
cated voters who blame themselves for their economic grievances since the distal
associations between their pocketbook and governmental policy are harder for them
(Gomez and Wilson 2001, 902). Sociotropic evaluations, on the other hand, are
common among less-sophisticated voters because they assume that the president
who is the most visible actor in the relevant sphere is responsible from the national
economy (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 903). On the contrary, the relatively more
sophisticated voters are able to comprehend that economic outcomes are beyond
the president’s ability and affected by many actors such as the Congress, Federal
Reserve, business community, and international actors (Gomez and Wilson 2001,
906). However, the clarity of the government’s political responsibility is a necessary
function for this account. Because the effects of economic performance weaken in
countries with diffused responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993, 399), even sophisti-
cated voters might have difficulty in assigning responsibility for economic outcomes
to incumbents. Thus, Powell and Whitten (1993) highlight the importance of po-
litical factors: the ideological image of the government, its electoral base, and the
clarity of its political responsibility that can affect the electoral impact of economic
performance (Powell and Whitten 1993, 391). Moreover, the usage of a relative
measure of economic performance by comparing it with the performance of other
industrialized democracies at the same time (Powell and Whitten 1993, 392) is very
crucial for preceding studies on economic voting.
For instance, Aytaç (2018, 16) notes that “economic voting is driven by the in-
cumbents’ relative performance”. Differently from Powell and Whitten (1993), he
introduces two reference points –i.e., a domestic and an international one– and
states that by domestic economic growth, voters can easily evaluate the current in-
cumbent’s performance by comparing the incumbent’s performance with those of
previous incumbents. Likewise, by international economic growth, voters can dis-
tinguish the incumbent’s performance from the exogenous economic shocks through
cross-national comparisons (Aytaç 2018, 18). In sum, these reference points make
easier to evaluate the incumbent’s performance, thus, provide a better assessment
of incumbent competence (Aytaç 2018, 18). Moreover, the unified perspective that
takes into consideration relative domestic and international growth have significant
implications for the literature on economic voting. However, he does not refer to
the relative importance of these reference points in the study.
I offer a theoretical account of the relative importance of these reference points
and look into the electoral salience of relative economic performance. Although the
unified perspective that takes account of both relative domestic and international
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growth has significant implications on economic voting, I argue that the omission of
the relative importance of reference points would lead to invalid conclusions about
voting behavior. When we analyze the support for the incumbent, it is odd to assume
that incumbents’ emphases on such references will be irrespective of the relative
importance of these reference points. Since the incumbents’ poor past performances
will be punished, they will put more weight on their relatively better economic
performances which lie in either domestic or international comparisons.
In the economic voting literature, there are a few studies that employ relative mea-
sures of economic outcomes as explanatory variables and none of them look at
the electoral importance of relative economic performance. Campello and Zucco
(2016), Kayser and Peress (2012), Leigh (2009), and Powell and Whitten (1993),
for instance, study the effect of relative international performance on incumbents’
electoral fortunes. In addition, Hansen, Olsen, and Bech (2015), and Kayser and
Leininger (2016) examine the electoral importance of relative international perfor-
mance, albeit using single country cases. Moreover, they do not include the domestic
aspect of relative performance in their analyses. The reason for the omission of rel-
ative domestic performance in the studies could be associated with including gross
domestic product (GDP) growth as a measure of economic performance, which is
often thought as a comparative measure (Aytac 2018, 17). However, a given value
of economic outcome for different countries might signal different levels of incum-
bent competence. For instance, although a 5% GDP annual growth rate in Turkey
can be accepted as normal, it is a high growth rate for the more developed United
Kingdom. Consequently, using GDP annual growth rate for measuring a country’s
economic growth more cannot explain incumbent competence unless one employs
reference points for within and cross-country comparisons.
Palmer and Whitten’s article (1999) is the only study that distinguishes the domestic
aspect of relative performance by focusing on the electoral effects of expected and
unexpected components of economic outcomes. They find that unexpected shocks
in growth and inflation have stronger effects on electoral outcomes than their overall
levels. However, the findings do not clearly demonstrate that voters are rewarding
incumbents on the grounds of whether because incumbents are competent or because
they are in power during a global expansion period.
Kayser and Peress (2012, 681) state that their aim is to show that voters in advanced
democracies make cross-national comparisons, but they leave unanswered whether it
is more or less important than within-country evaluations. Moreover, their analysis
does not include developing countries since they examine elections only from high-
income OECD countries.
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Aytaç (2018) recognizes the impact of both relative domestic and international eco-
nomic growth on incumbent vote share. He develops a reference point theory for
both sorts of growth and argues that these reference points allow voters to put the
incumbent’s performance into the proper domestic and international contexts (Ay-
taç 2018, 22). Although his study has significant contributions to our understanding
of electoral accountability, it does not account for the relative importance of these
reference points neither.
2.2 Theoretical Overview
2.2.1 Substitutive Nature of Relative Economic Performance
I offer a theoretical account for the relative importance of the reference points. In
terms of incumbents’ domestic and international references to their relative eco-
nomic performances, I argue that they will put more weight on their relatively
better economic outcomes in domestic and international comparisons since voters
reward incumbents in the elections who present relatively better economic perfor-
mance. Consequently, the use of domestic and international reference points by
incumbents varies depending on the relative performance of these reference points.
For instance, if the difference between relative domestic and international economic
growth is substantial, and international comparisons are significantly better than
domestic outcomes, then incumbent parties would be more likely to stress on their
international economic performance to cover up domestic macroeconomic problems.
Historical and international accounts of the Turkish economy’s performance might
constitute a suitable example when they are used substitutively to explain the voting
behavior and the success of the ruling AK Party in the last 12 elections. Before
every parliamentary, presidential, and local elections, the question of ‘where is the
economy headed?’ is at the center of electoral debates.1. So far in every election
since 2002, when AK Party came to power, the ruling party managed to have a
significant electoral victory. Consequently, even in times of economic slowdown like
1Melek Hilal Eroğlu, “Turkish Polls: Economic Growth Effective Voting Determinant When Relatively
Meaningful,” Daily Sabah, March 2, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2019/03/02/turkish-
polls-economic-growth-effective-voting-determinant-when-relatively-meaningful
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in 2009, one possible answer to the question of how did the AK Party manage to
secure wins, lies in a closer look to the substitutive natures of relative domestic and
international performance of the Turkish economy in the discourse of party elites.
Using different references before every election strikingly demonstrates the relative
importance of domestic and international economic growth. Erdoğan’s statements
regarding his domestic achievements in terms of growing economy and taming in-
flation since AK Party is coming to power in November 2002 would indicate that
domestic economic growth is better than the international growth at the time, while
during the 2008 financial crisis, Erdoğan’s remarks about the global financial crisis
of 2008-9 would only slightly touch upon the Turkish economy, highlighting the rel-
ative importance of international rather than domestic growth on the AK Party’s
vote share. During a rally before the 2011 elections, Erdoğan had said:
“Turkey’s economy is in a much better situation than the global av-
erage, especially Europe, despite the many risks around. Our country
is geographically proximate to many crisis regions in the Middle East,
North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. All developments in our
neighbors Syria and Iraq directly affect us”2
In the aftermath of the global financial meltdown of 2008, only two years before the
2011 elections when the AK Party emerged triumphant with 49.8 percent of the total
votes, the Turkish economy contracted by 4.7 percent.3 The global financial crisis
in 2008 and 2009 yielded the worst domestic economic growth during an AK Party
government, the Turkish economy still saw a better outcome relative to the so-called
target countries. The growth of Turkey’s top five main export partners – Germany,
Iraq, the U.K., Italy, and France – could only an average growth rate of 0.4 percent
between 2007 and 2011 as opposed to the 1.5 percent average GDP expansion of
the Turkish economy in this period. These figures earned Turkey a margin of 1.3
percent in relative international growth, which is better than the domestic growth.
Hence, Erdoğan had chosen to highlight relative international rather than domestic
economic growth since it was the one showing a positive value.
Only 15 days ahead of the June 24 elections in 2018, the first-quarter economic
growth data were announced and Erdoğan immediately hailed the results, particu-
2“Turkey’s Economy Faring Better Than World, Europe: Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, November
4, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-economy-faring-better-than-world-europe-erdogan–
105761
3Eroğlu, “Turkish Polls.”
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larly pointing to the comparatively high performance of the Turkish economy vis-
à-vis the G20 and other OECD countries. “The Turkish economy expanded by 7.4
percent in the first quarter of this year. It came first among the OECD member-
countries and ranks second among the G20 countries. Turkey continues to be one
of the fastest-growing economies in the world,” the President said on Twitter by
pointing international growth.
Consequently, incumbents’ strategy to stress upon which reference point (domes-
tic and international) prior to elections varies depending on which implies higher
economic performance.
H1: The marginal effect of Relative International Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
is positive and strongest when Relative Domestic Growth is at its lowest level. This
effect declines in magnitude as Relative Domestic Growth increases.
H2: The marginal effect of Relative Domestic Growth on Incumbent Vote Share is
positive and strongest when Relative International Growth is at its lowest level. This
effect declines in magnitude as Relative International Growth increases.
2.2.1.1 The Strength of Opponent
Economic voting is essential for electoral accountability and thus for democracy.
According to the economic voting theory, incumbent governments that provide poor
economic outcomes will be punished by voters in elections. As a result, governments
which subject to recurring popular elections govern better and watch over the well-
being of their citizens to be re-elected (Kayser and Peress 2012, 680). However,
if there is no reliable opponent party or candidate, how can we understand that
electoral accountability works? The standard view of how electoral accountability
works in previous literature is that “voters set some standard of performance to
evaluate governments, and they vote out the incumbent unless these criteria are
fulfilled” (Hindriks and Myles 2013, 644). Thus, in order to vote out the incumbent
when voters’ expectations are not fulfilled by the government, a reliable challenger
should be there as an alternative to the incumbent.
Therefore, the existence of a strong challenger is important for the economic voting
hypothesis, which necessitates holding the incumbent responsible for the economic
outcomes. The study of Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım (2018, 177) supports this argument
by stating that the weak economic development is not enough for explaining incum-
bent vote share, but also there should be a credible alternative party or candidate.
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Otherwise, even though the macroeconomic performance of the incumbents is poor,
if there is not an alternative party that is considered better in its expected macroe-
conomic performance, voters would not respond to the incumbent’s poor economic
record.
The availability of a challenger is not sufficient to vote for the opponent
party/candidate as an electoral response to the incumbent when the incumbent’s
macroeconomic performance watches poorly. This challenger should be also reliable
and electorally strong. When the vote share of the opponent is close to that of the
incumbent, voting for the opponent party/candidate is more likely according to the
rational choice theory.
According to the basic model of voting, citizens have three simple actions in a two-
candidate election contest: vote for one candidate, vote for the other, or abstain from
voting. Citizens’ preferences are defined over outcomes and there are three outcomes
(A wins, tie, B wins) with their related utilities for the individual (Aldrich 1993).
Rational choice theory suggests that “expected utility associated with outcomes
generates preferences for the particular actions at hand... and the individual prefers
outcomes with the higher utility to those with lower utility and chooses actions to
receive more highly valued outcomes” (Aldrich 1993, 248). If costs of voting, the
C term, which are obtaining and processing information, and deciding what to do
in addition to registering and going to the polls are greater than the benefits, the
voter should always abstain (Aldrich 1993). Most of the time, C is greater since the
probability of making or breaking a tie by only one vote, P term, is very small and
it would make the benefits, the B term, derived from electing a preferred candidate
to office also small.
R = PB- C
The calculus of voting developed by Downs (1957) and extended by Riker and Or-
deshook (1968) (Aldrich 1993, 251) added a famous D-term which represents the
value of doing one’s duty as a citizen, civic duty, which is expected to increase turn
out (Aldrich 1993, 251; Moral 2016, 733-34).
R = PB - C + D
Accordingly, a close contest is one of the conditions for the electoral accountability
mechanism to work. In a close contest in which the vote share of the opponent
is close to that of the incumbent, shifting of vote choice from incumbent to oppo-
nent party/candidate is more likely given that the expected utility associated with
outcomes increases with the higher P term.
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In close contests, both the challenger and incumbent would conduct an effective
electoral campaign. In bad economic circumstances, incumbents are more vulner-
able and strong challengers are more likely to run (Aldrich 1993, 267). Thus, the
B term would be higher as a result of increasing information and awareness levels
of the electorate about the differences in policy offerings of the candidates (Aldrich
1993, 273: Geys 2006, 648). Moreover, the P term, probability of affecting the elec-
tion result (i.e., making or breaking a tie) increases in close contests (Aldrich 1993,
268; Geys 2006, 646); and lastly campaigns help voters remember to vote and feel
more civic duty, the so-called D term (Aldrich 1993, 267; Geys 2006, 648). Hence,
higher P, B, and D terms can help increase the opponent’s support. Such political
factors, closeness of vote shares and campaign expenditures would likely to affect
the electoral results. Overall, in the bad economic conditions, the electoral strength
of the opponent party would likely to have a decreasing effect on the incumbent’s
vote. The electorate would evaluate the challenger party or candidate as a strong
and credible alternative that would provide the better economic performance. Con-
sequently, electoral accountability works better through the electoral punishment of
the incumbent who is no longer seen as the only option as a result of the emergence
of a strong opponent. Thus, voters may hold the incumbent responsible for the
unsatisfactory economic performance and shift their preferences.
H3: The marginal effect of opponent strength on incumbent’s vote share is nega-
tive and strongest when the relative economic performances are lower. This effect
declines in magnitude as the relative domestic and international economic growth
increases.
Another important concern that can affect the working of electoral accountability
mechanism is that the ideological position of the major opponent party as well as its
electoral strength. The ideological position of the parties is important as much as
the strength of the party. Although the opponent party might have strong electoral
support, people might not see it as an alternative in bad economic times due to its
ideological position. Hence, ideological polarization between the incumbent and op-
ponent parties is another important explanatory variable for incumbent vote share.
In previous literature, scholars looked into the relationship between polarization and
turnout and reached conflicting findings about the direction of the effect of polariza-
tion on voter turnout. Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, 552) found that contrary
to what Fiorina (1978) argues since the 1970s, ideological polarization has increased
among the mass public in the U.S. as well as among political elites; and polarization
energizes the electorate and stimulates political participation. They argue that the
greater the perceived difference by voters between the parties, voters’ payoff, the B
term, will be greater. Consequently, voters care more about who wins the election
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and they engage more in politics (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, 552). However,
contrary to what Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) argue, Rogowski (2014, 487)
found that when the ideological divergence between pairs of candidates in the U.S.
House and Senate races increases from 25th to 75th percentile, turnout propensity
decreases by about 5 percentage points.
With respect to the U.S. case, it is stated that “polarization without a centrist
third party alternative may alienate citizens at around the center of the ideological
space, and therefore lead to a decrease in turnout due to the alienation of those with
moderate ideological views” (Moral 2017, 939). However, the effects of party po-
larization on turnout rate in European democracies, which have multiparty systems
and provide voters with a number of distinct party policies, are different from the
U.S. case. Moral (2017, 951) found that both actual and perceived party polariza-
tion increases voter turnout in multiparty systems since proportional representation
(PR) systems provide relevant policy alternatives to those with moderate views as
well (Moral 2017, 941). Consequently, diversity and distinctiveness of party policy
offerings are identified as crucial factors in voting behavior (Moral 2017, 936).
By accounting for these conflicting arguments on the effect of polarization on
turnout, I argue that for shifting of the vote from incumbent party to opponent
party in bad economic times, polarization between the incumbent and the opponent
party should not be so large. Because the opponent party is needed to be recognized
by voters as a credible alternative. At the same time, some ideological divergence
between parties should be necessary for a higher B term, the payoff derived from
the differences in policy offerings of the candidates. As a result, I measure polar-
ization by taking into account the distances between the two main parties in the
system. Following two different spatial models, Downs’ (1957) proximity model,
and Rabinowitz and MacDonald’s (1989) directional model, polarization is defined
as negative if the parties are on different sides of the median value of 5, and positive
if they are on the same side, which is also similar to what Orriols and Balcells (2012,
398) suggest in their study. I argue that only positive polarization has a negative
effect on incumbent’s vote. The expectation is that under bad economic conditions,
rational voters would shift their preferences to the strongest second party with the
similar ideological offering, which is viewed as ideologically acceptable by voters
(Moral and Zhirnov 2018).
H4: The marginal effect of positive polarization on incumbent’s vote share is negative
and strongest when the opponent strength is at its highest level. This effect declines
in magnitude as polarization decreases.
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2.3 Research Design
In this section, I will focus on the electoral consequences of relative economic perfor-
mances in domestic and international comparisons. Ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions will be employed in empirical analyses of the proposed hypotheses. All
estimations were conducted in STATA version 15. The unit of analysis is country-
election year. Country-level statistical analysis of substitutive effects of relative
domestic and international economic growth on incumbent vote share constitutes
the central component of the research. In this section, I briefly review the data
compilation efforts for the empirical study of economic voting hypothesis, explain
the coding procedure and the operationalization of relative domestic and interna-
tional performance along with the opponent strength and party polarization, and
then provide an overview of the dataset.
2.3.1 Data
I employ an extended cross-national dataset covering 501 national-level executive
elections in 63 countries from 1960 to 2017. The dataset includes the elections from
developing democracies along with those from high-income OECD countries. The
sample comprises of countries with higher democracy ratings according to the Polity
IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002) and excludes post-communist countries. This
decision is informed by the literature suggesting that these countries have a different
dynamic in terms of economic voting: fluctuating economic condition as a result of
the transition from communism create long-lasting effects on voting behavior. Par-
ties’ stance vis-a-vis the communist past and the reform period rather than their
economic performance determine voting behavior (Aytaç 2018; Fidrmuc 2000; Pop-
Eleches and Tucker 2011; Tucker 2006). In other words, in post-communist coun-
tries, voters reward pro-transition parties instead of the incumbent party in times of
growing economy (Tucker 2006, 33-34). Hence, parties’ relationships with the tran-
sition are a better determinant of their electoral fortunes than they are according
to the conventional economic voting hypothesis in non-communist countries.
The dependent variable in this analysis is the vote share of the incumbent party, In-
cumbent Vote, in presidential and legislative elections. Incumbent party corresponds
to the prime minister’s party in parliamentary democracies and to the president’s
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Figure 2.1 Relative Domestic Growth Measure
Electiont−1 Electiont Electiont+1
Now
GrowthPrevious GrowthCurrent
Relative Domestic Growth=GrowthCurrent - GrowthPrevious
party in presidential and semi-presidential democracies. Even in coalition govern-
ments, the prime minister’s party is rewarded or punished for economic outcomes
(Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008). In
this respect, taking the vote share of the incumbent party as the dependent variable
is a standard operationalization in the literature (e.g., Hellwig and Samuels 2007;
Duch and Stevenson 2008; Kayser and Peress 2012). For multi-round elections, I use
electoral results from the first round of elections. Similarly, if the country witnessed
two general elections in the same year, the first election’s outcomes are used in the
analysis. Furthermore, the incumbent party vote share in the previous election, Pre-
vious Vote of Incumbent, is also included in the models to control for past election
outcomes.
The key independent variables in the analyses are measures of relative domestic
and international economic performance. I used Aytaç’s (2018) measure of relative
domestic economic performance as illustrated in Figure 2.1. It is measured by taking
the difference in average annual real GDP growth rates of the current incumbent’s
term and the previous term. According to the proposed measure voters at the
time of Electiont+1evaluate the relative domestic performance of the incumbent by
comparing the current growth (from Electiont to Electiont+1) with previous growth
(from Electiont−1 to Electiont). Accordingly, the difference between these average
growths gives Relative Domestic Growth. Suppose that the current average growth
of the incumbent’s term is 7%, and that of the previous term is 3%. Then, relative
domestic growth takes the value of 4%. Moreover, by following Hellwig and Samuels
(2007), I do not include economic data from the election year but the year preceding
the election if the election was held in the first six months of the year. For instance,
if the election is held in March 2014, the year 2014 is dropped from the incumbent’s
examined term.
Aytaç’s (2018) measure of relative domestic growth is dissimilar to the previous
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economic voting literature since the incumbent’s whole term is taken into account.
However, in previous studies, economic conditions in narrower periods such as the
election-year are taken as the economic explanatory variables (Healy and Lenz 2014,
31). As a result, I measure Relative Election-year Domestic Growth by taking the
difference in average economic growth between only the current (Electiont+1) and
previous election years (Electiont). This theoretically guided measure is in line with
the existing literature suggesting that “voters... reward incumbents not broadly for
economic growth throughout incumbents’ terms, but narrowly for conditions in the
six months or year before Election Day” (Healy and Lenz 2014, 31). However, I may
not capture the true effect of relative election-year growth by this measure since the
year of economic data included in the analysis varies depending on whether the
election was held in the first six months of the year. For instance, in a country
where the election was held in May, the year preceding the election will be included
which means the economic data of the last 5 months disregarded from the analysis.
Similarly, in a country where the election was held in August, the economic data
of the whole election-year will be included which means the economic data of first
8 months of the year will be extrapolated to last 4 months of the year. Therefore,
in order to decrease measurement error, I measure last two years’ domestic and
relative domestic growths. The former is quite clear, it includes only the average
economic growth in the last two years’ of the incumbent’s term. The effects of the
last two years’ domestic and international economic outcomes on incumbent vote
share are illustrated in Table A.3 and Figure A.1 of the appendix. The latter, last
two years’ relative domestic growth, is measured by taking the difference in last two
years’ average growth of incumbent and that of the previous term. However, con-
sidering the whole term rather than shorter periods is more relevant for evaluating
the incumbent’s competence according to Aytaç (2018) since it is more informative.
Empirical evidence suggesting that the election-year economic outcomes are signif-
icant determinants of incumbent vote share (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2004; Kiewiet
1983; Kramer 1971) might not be generalizable to other countries since all such
studies are about the U.S. presidential elections (Aytaç 2018, 24). In all models, I,
however, control for the election-year growth in real GDP, Election-Year Growth, to
assess whether it also has an impact on incumbent vote share.
Before measuring the second key independent variable, Relative International Eco-
nomic Growth, we need first to get an international reference point. I thus follow
Kayser and Peress (2012), and as does Aytaç (2018). First, I identified the top five
export markets for each country and election year. The weighted average growth
rate of the top five export markets of a given country gives the international ref-
erence point, International Growth (Kayser and Peress 2012, 666). Weights are
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Figure 2.2 Relative International Growth Measure
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Relative International Growth=Average GDP Growth of the Country - Average
GDP Growth of the Top-five Export Market
the proportion of exports sent to each market, thus, the top export markets would
have a higher effect on the country’s international reference point (Aytaç 2018, 24).
Following Aytaç (2018), the difference between the average growth of a country dur-
ing the incumbent’s term and the weighted average growth rate of the country’s
five export markets gives relative international growth, which is presented in Figure
2.2 For instance, Germany’s top five export partners between 2013 and 2017 were
as: the U.S., France, China, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The average
GDP growth of these countries during this period was 3% and the average GDP
growth of Germany in the same period was 2%, as a result, the relative interna-
tional growth became -1%. Furthermore, as I considered an alternative measure to
relative domestic growth, relative election-year growth, I create a variable relative
election-year international growth which takes the difference in real GDP growth
between the incumbent’s term election-year and that of top five export markets.
The effects of relative election-year domestic and international economic growth on
incumbent vote share are presented in Table A.4 and Figure A.2 of the appendix.
Moreover, I consider the last two years’ relative international growth which is mea-
sured by taking the difference in average growth of the last two years’ between the
incumbent’s term and those of its top five export markets. The effects of last two
years’ relative domestic and international economic growth on incumbent vote share
are shown in the Table 2.3 and Figure 2.5 of the analysis section.
The model specification is thus as follows:
̂Incumbent Vote = βˆ0 + βˆ1(Relative Domestic Growth x Relative Interna-
tional Growth)+βˆ2(Relative Domestic Growth)+βˆ3(Relative International
Growth)+βˆ4(International Growth)+βˆ5(Election-year Growth)+βˆ6(Previous Vote
of Incumbent)+βˆ7(Coalition)+βˆ8(Effective Number of Parties)+βˆ9(Presidential
System)
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There are many ways to measure party strength. My conception of party strength
is related to the parties’ electoral strength, therefore, it will be measured by parties’
vote share in the previous election rather than their seat shares in the legislature
(e.g., Giles and Pritchard 1985; Primo and Snyder 2010). Thus, for measuring the
strength of the opponent, the second-largest party in the electorate will be taken as
the main opponent.
The model specification is as follows:
̂Incumbent Vote = βˆ0 + βˆ1(Opponent Strength x Relative Domestic Growth x
Relative International Growth)+βˆ2(Opponent Strength x Relative Domestic
Growth)+βˆ3(Opponent Strength x Relative International Growth)+βˆ3(Relative
Domestic Growth x Relative International Growth)+βˆ4(Opponent
Strength)+βˆ5(Relative Domestic Growth)+βˆ6(Relative International
Growth)+βˆ7(International Growth)+βˆ8(Election-year Growth)+βˆ9(Previous Vote
of Incumbent)+βˆ10(Coalition)+βˆ11(Effective Number of Parties)+βˆ12(Presidential
System)
In country-level regressions, since I focus on the vote share of the incumbent party,
in order to measure party polarization I look at the incumbent and the opponent
parties’ ideological positions on the left-right continuum. I used the left-right scores
in ParlGov dataset (Doring and Manows 2019), which is operationalized on a 0-10
scale with the data from Castles and Mair (1984). At the country-level, I estimate
polarization by taking into account the distances of two main parties in the system.
Inspired from two different spatial models: the proximity (Downs 1957) and the
directional model (Rabinowitz and MacDoanld 1989), polarization is measured by
the absolute distance between the incumbent party’s left/right position and that of
the opponent party. However, I recoded polarization as negative if parties are on
different sides of the median value of 5, which is similar to Orriols and Balcells’ (2012,
398) operationalization of electoral utilities of voters at individual-level. Suppose
that the incumbent party’s position is 7 and that of the opponent party is 4, then
the polarization is coded as -3. However, if that of the opponent party is 6, the
polarization would take the value of 1.
The model specification is as follows:
̂Incumbent Vote = βˆ0 + βˆ1(Opponent Strength x Polarization)+βˆ2(Opponent
Strength)+βˆ3(Polarization)+βˆ4(Relative Domestic Growth x Relative Inter-
national Growth)+βˆ5(Relative Domestic Growth)+βˆ6(Relative International
Growth)+βˆ7(International Growth)+βˆ8(Election-year Growth)+βˆ9(Previous Vote
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of Incumbent)+βˆ10(Coalition)+βˆ11(Effective Number of Parties)+βˆ12(Presidential
System)
There are some other commonly employed control variables in literature. The exis-
tence of a coalition government in parliamentary democracies, Coalition, is expected
to have a negative effect on the vote share of the incumbent party. I control for the
effective number of parties, Effective Number of Parties, which should also be neg-
atively associated with parties’ vote shares. In case of missing data regarding the
effective number of parties, I used Gallagher (2019) dataset. The models also in-
clude a control for the election type, Presidential System, which is a dummy variable
indicating whether the election is presidential or legislative. All variables are listed
in the Table A.2 of the appendix.
2.4 Empirical Analyses and Findings
2.4.1 Substitutive Nature of Relative Economic Performance
All models are estimated with OLS regression using robust standard errors clustered
by country following with the standard approach in the previous literature (e.g., Bar-
tels 2014; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Kayser and Peress 2012). Using the extended
dataset, Table 2.1 presents the findings for recent models of economic voting in pre-
vious literature which emphasize the effect of relative economic performance of gov-
ernment on incumbent vote share (Aytaç 2018). In Model 1, election-year growth
is taken as the key independent variable as in the traditional model of economic
voting. It is seen that growth in the election year is positively associated with the
incumbent vote share as suggested in the existing literature. Model 2 includes the
measures which are recently introduced by Aytaç (2018), Relative Domestic Growth
and Relative International Growth. The effects of both variables on incumbent vote
share are positive and statistically significant in line with Aytaç (2018).
Table 2.2 presents a comparison of the recent model of economic voting employ-
ing relative measures of economic conditions (Aytaç 2018) and my model, which
introduces the new interaction of relative performances. In Model 1, positive and
21
Table 2.1 OLS Regression on Incumbent Vote Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model.1 Model.2
Relative Domestic Growth 0.560***
(0.164)
Relative International Growth 0.919***
(0.271)
International Growth 0.408
(0.315)
Election-year Growth 0.414*** 0.036
(0.144) (0.133)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.644*** 0.649***
(0.074) (0.072)
Coalition 0.325 0.099
(1.184) (1.137)
Effective Number of Parties -1.782*** -1.805***
(0.415) (0.414)
Presidential -0.460 -0.885
(1.077) (1.155)
Constant 15.065*** 15.094***
(3.755) (3.751)
N 501 501
R2 0.514 0.556
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
statistically significant effects of relative domestic and international growth provide
evidence for the argument in previous literature that voters reward (punish) incum-
bents who present relatively better (worse) economic performances in domestic and
international comparisons. Furthermore, even though the election-year growth is
taken as the main indicator in the earlier studies on economic voting, its effect on
the incumbent’s vote is no longer significant after accounting the measures for rel-
ative performance. Figure 2.3 illustrates the predicted effects of relative domestic
and international economic growth on incumbent vote share. Substantively speak-
ing, the findings indicate that for each percentage point increase in relative domestic
growth, the incumbent’s vote increases by .6% percent. One percentage increase in
relative international growth is associated with a 1.1% percentage point increase in
incumbent vote share.
Model 2 introduces my interaction of relative performances, Relative Domestic
Growth x Relative International Growth. It has a negative effect on the incum-
bent’s vote which provides some evidence for the first two hypotheses that relative
domestic growth (international growth) has an enhancing effect on the incumbent
22
Figure 2.3 Relative Domestic and International Growth (Additive Model)
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Note: The graph illustrates the out-of-sample predictions of relative international and domestic
growth on incumbent vote. The colored area indicates the confidence intervals at 95% level
(N=501).
vote share when the relative international growth (domestic growth) is lower. The
negative coefficient on the interaction term means that this enhancing effect in-
creases as relative international growth (domestic growth) decreases. However, we
know interpreting results of an interactive model based on the information in Table
2.2 can be difficult in understanding the relationship (Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2006, 75). Therefore, Figure 2.4 graphically illustrates how the marginal effect of
relative domestic economic growth (international growth) varies across the in-sample
range of relative international growth (domestic economic).
Figure 2.4 based on Model 2 in Table 2.2, shows the conditional effect of relative
international growth across the in-sample range of relative domestic growth. The
marginal effect of relative international growth on incumbent vote share decreases
when relative domestic economic growth increases. The effect of relative inter-
national growth is statistically significant only for the values of relative domestic
growth that are less than 3. The marginal effect of relative international growth
is not statistically distinguishable from 0 for the values of relative domestic growth
higher than 3. The findings support my first hypothesis that the positive marginal
effect of relative international growth on incumbent vote share is stronger when rela-
tive domestic growth is lower. This effect declines in magnitude as relative domestic
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Table 2.2 Substitutive Nature of Relative Domestic and International Economic
Growth
Incumbent Vote Share Model.1 Model.2
Relative Domestic Growth × -0.111**
Relative International Growth (0.044)
Relative Domestic Growth 0.560*** 0.586***
(0.164) (0.187)
Relative International Growth 0.919*** 0.848***
(0.271) (0.245)
International Growth 0.408 0.400
(0.315) (0.314)
Election-year Growth 0.036 0.041
(0.133) (0.123)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.649*** 0.653***
(0.072) (0.072)
Coalition 0.099 -0.113
(1.137) (1.141)
Effective Number of Parties -1.805*** -1.798***
(0.414) (0.406)
Presidential System -0.885 -1.028
(1.155) (1.140)
Constant 15.094*** 15.312***
(3.751) (3.712)
N 501 501
R2 0.556 0.561
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
growth (international growth) increases.
Figure 2.4 shows the marginal effect of relative domestic growth for the sample
range of relative international growth based on Table 2.2. It is significant only when
relative international growth is lower than 3. The t value at 3 of international growth
is 1.41 which falls below the critical value. It means that only for lower levels of
relative international growth, the effect of relative domestic growth on incumbent
vote share is statistically significant. The findings also support the second hypothesis
that the positive marginal effect of relative domestic growth on incumbent vote
share is stronger when relative international growth is lower. This effect declines
in magnitude as relative international growth increases. That is at a value of 3
and higher of relative international growth, relative domestic growth has no effect
on incumbent vote share. If we compare the average marginal effects of relative
domestic and international growth, the marginal effect of international growth on
24
Figure 2.4 The Average Marginal Effects of Relative International and Domestic
Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
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Note: The graph illustrates the marginal effect of relative international growth (domestic growth)
on incumbent vote for different values of relative domestic growth (international growth).
The colored area indicates 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors. (N=501).
incumbent vote share over the range of domestic growth is higher than that of
domestic growth.
2.4.1.1 An Alternative Measure for Relative Performances
In Table 2.3, we see an alternative measure to relative domestic and international
performance. The measure of relative domestic performance is the difference in ave-
rage annual real GDP growth between the current incumbent’s term and the previous
term. However, for a deeper understanding of how voters evaluate the present
economic outcomes by considering the previous periods, I construct an alternative
measure which takes account of the last two years’ of the incumbent’s term and
the previous term. It is an alternative to relative domestic performance. Similarly,
for the relative international growth, I consider the difference between the last two
25
Table 2.3 The Effects of Last Two Years’ Relative Domestic and International Eco-
nomic Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model 1 Model 2
Last 2 years’ Relative Domestic Growth × -0.108***
Last 2 years’ Relative International Growth (0.022)
Last 2 years’ Relative Domestic Growth 0.139 0.341
(0.290) (0.302)
Last 2 years’ Relative International Growth 1.225*** 1.361***
(0.415) (0.346)
International Growth 1.102** 1.130**
(0.541) (0.530)
Election-year Growth -0.261 -0.348*
(0.238) (0.189)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.672*** 0.691***
(0.107) (0.104)
Coalition 0.328 0.336
(1.605) (1.429)
Effective Number of Parties -1.715*** -1.670***
(0.507) (0.477)
Presidential System -1.076 -1.075
(1.617) (1.614)
Constant 12.553** 12.247**
(5.257) (5.046)
N 273 273
R2 0.483 0.502
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
years’ domestic growth and that of the average of the top-five markets. To test this
proposition, I generate the variables Last 2 years’ Relative Domestic Growth and
Last 2 years’ Relative International Growth. In Model 1, we see that the last two
years’ relative domestic growth does not predict incumbent vote share. This result is
not surprising since the expectation is that the original measure of relative domestic
growth provides voters with more information about the incumbent’s competence
because of the inclusion of the incumbent’s whole term. However, we cannot argue
the same for the alternative measure for relative international growth. The effect
of the last two years’ international growth on incumbent vote share is positive and
significant. Moreover, its coefficient is larger than that of the previous models.
Substantively, the analysis indicates that for each percentage point increase in new
measure of relative international growth, the incumbent’s vote increases by 1.2%
percent, which is similar to the original measure of relative international growth.
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Figure 2.5 The Average Marginal Effects of Last Two Years’ Relative Domestic and
International Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=273).
Model 2 introduces the interaction of relative performances of the last two years’,
Last 2 years’ Domestic Growth x Last 2 years’ International Growth. It has nega-
tive effects on the incumbent vote share which means that last two years’ relative
domestic growth (international growth) has an enhancing effect on the incumbent
vote share when the last two years’ relative international growth (domestic growth)
is lower. The negative coefficient on the interaction term means that its mediating
effect increases as the last two years’ relative international growth (domestic growth)
decreases. Figure 2.5 graphically illustrates how the marginal effect of the last two
years’ relative domestic economic growth (international growth) varies across the
in-sample range of the last two years’ relative international growth (domestic eco-
nomic).
Based on Model 2 in Table 2.3 Figure 2.5 shows the conditional effect of last two
years’ relative international growth across the in-sample range of last two years’
relative domestic growth. The marginal effect of international growth on incumbent
vote share decreases when domestic economic growth increases. The effect of relative
international growth is statistically significant only for the values of the last two
years’ relative domestic growths less than 8 at 95% confidence level. Regarding the
marginal effect of last two years’ relative domestic growth for the in-sample range
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of last two years’ relative international growth, it is significant only when last two
years’ relative international growth is lower than -2. This means that only for lower
levels of international growth, the effect of domestic growth on incumbent vote share
is statistically significant.
When we compare the average marginal effects of last two years’ relative interna-
tional growth and our original measure of relative international growth, the marginal
effect of the last two years’ international growth on incumbent vote share is sub-
stantively more significant than that of the original measure. However, the sample
size substantially decreases from 501 to 273 in Table 2.3.
2.4.2 The Opponent Party Strength
The third hypothesis is regarding the availability of a reliable alternative challenger
as a condition for the electoral salience of relative domestic and international per-
formance. My dataset includes vote shares of other parties from a diverse set of
developed and developing countries, which allows us to test this hypothesis.
In close contests and bad economic conditions, alternative candidates have a greater
likelihood of winning the election. Following the rational choice theory (Aldrich
1993, 246), the benefits derived from electing an alternative candidate would be
higher in close contests with the higher P term, the probability of making or breaking
a tie. Consequently, the electorate would evaluate and vote for the challenger party,
which is believed to win the election and perform better in economic terms. From
this point of view, bad economic conditions become a special case that can affect vote
choices only when opponent strength is high. From an empirical standpoint, this
implies a three-way interaction. Thus, I introduce a three-way interaction between
relative economic measures and opponent strength.
The results in Table 2.4 present the effect of opponent strength and the conditional
effects of relative economic measures and opponent strength on incumbent vote
share. In Model 1, we see that opponent strength has a negative effect on incumbent
vote share, a result in line with my expectation, but this effect is not statistically
significant. Model 2 introduces the three-way interaction of relative domestic and
international economic performance and opponent strength. In order to understand
the effect of corresponding three-way interaction for opponent strength along with
the relative economic measures and to asses varying effects of these measures on the
predicted outcome it is needed to graphically illustrate.
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Table 2.4 The Effect of Opponent Strength on Incumbent Vote Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model 1 Model 2
Opponent Strength × Relative Domestic Growth 0.014***
× Relative International Growth (0.005)
Opponent Strength × Relative Domestic Growth -0.019
(0.028)
Opponent Strength × Relative International Growth 0.008
(0.021)
Relative Domestic Growth × Relative International Growth -0.106 -0.516***
(0.083) (0.178)
Opponent Strength -0.052 -0.075
(0.052) (0.050)
Polarization -0.276** -0.298**
(0.116) (0.119)
Relative Domestic Growth 0.246 0.840
(0.164) (0.869)
Relative International Growth 0.608** 0.432
(0.217) (0.722)
International Growth 0.550* 0.582*
(0.305) (0.311)
Election-year Growth 0.013 0.001
(0.101) (0.095)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.671*** 0.666***
(0.075) (0.072)
Coalition -0.345 -0.230
(1.057) (1.042)
Effective Number of Parties -1.656*** -1.704***
(0.512) (0.483)
Presidential System 3.996 3.966
(3.287) (3.293)
Constant 14.906** 15.819***
(5.683) (5.428)
N 298 298
R2 0.715 0.719
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Figure 2.6 provides some evidence for the third hypothesis. In bad economic times,
the effect of opponent strength on incumbent vote share is negative and strongest.
Figure 2.6 plots the conditional effect of opponent strength (Model 2) across the in-
sample range of relative domestic and international growth. The marginal effect of
opponent strength on incumbent vote share is stronger in bad economic times when
either relative domestic or international growth takes negative values. However, it
becomes statistically significant only after a threshold. In other words, the opponent
strength has a negative and statistically significant effect only when relative domestic
29
Figure 2.6 The Average Marginal Effect of Opponent Strength on Incumbent Vote
Share
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=298).
or international growth is at their lower levels. The effect decreases in magnitude
as the relative economic measures are close to 0, which are also close to their mean
values. The intriguing finding is that in very bad economic conditions where both
the relative domestic or international economic performance is low and negative,
the effect of opponent strength on incumbent vote share is positive, however, it is
not statistically significant. When relative international growth is at -6 and relative
domestic growth is at 4 and higher, the average marginal effect of opponent strength
on incumbent vote share is negative and statistically significant. When relative
domestic growth is at its lowest level -8 and relative international growth is at its
highest level 8 average marginal effect of opponent strength on incumbent vote share
is also negative and statistically significant. The incumbent vote share increases as
opponent strength increases when relative international growth is at 8 and relative
domestic growth is at 6 and higher.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the predicted incumbent vote share over the in-sample range of
opponent strength which is held fixed at one standard deviation above the mean and
one standard deviation below the mean. I also define high values of relative domestic
and international growth as being one standard deviation above their respective
means. Lower values are defined as one standard deviation below their means.
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Figure 2.7 Predicted Incumbent Vote Share for Different Values of Relative Domestic
and International Growth, and Opponent Strength
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Altogether there are four possible combinations for each denoted value of opponent
strength (20 and 40). Figure 2.7 presents similar findings in Figure 2.6. Either
relative domestic or international growth are their low levels, the incumbent vote
share decreases when there is a two standard deviation move on opponent strength.
In order to answer to what extent the effect of relative economic measures depends
on opponent strength, I look to the differences in predicted incumbent vote shares.
When the relative domestic growth is 1.9% and the relative international growth is
at -1.73%, the difference is 3.5 (35.3- 31.8= 3.5) largest effect compared to other
conditions. The predicted incumbent vote share decreases as the opponent strength
increases from 20% to 40%. A similar but weaker association can be observed when
relative domestic growth is -2.3% and relative international growth is 2.5%. The
difference between predicted incumbent vote shares in given conditions is 1.9 (36.5-
34.6 = 1.9) which is the second largest effect of opponent strength on incumbent
vote share.
The findings in Table 2.5 show the effects of polarization in ideological positions of
incumbent and opponent parties, and opponent strength on incumbent vote share.
In Model 1, polarization has a negative and statistically significant effect on incum-
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Table 2.5 The Effects of Polarization and Opponent Strength on Incumbent Vote
Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model 1 Model 2
Opponent Strength × Polarization -0.030**
(0.012)
Opponent Strength -0.052 -0.126*
(0.052) (0.062)
Polarization -0.276** 0.537
(0.116) (0.374)
Relative Domestic Growth × -0.106 -0.107
Relative International Growth (0.083) (0.084)
Relative Domestic Growth 0.246 0.218
(0.164) (0.162)
Relative International Growth 0.608** 0.671***
(0.217) (0.231)
International Growth 0.550* 0.601*
(0.305) (0.307)
Election-year Growth 0.013 0.005
(0.101) (0.101)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.671*** 0.673***
(0.075) (0.074)
Coalition -0.345 -0.426
(1.057) (1.039)
Effective Number of Parties -1.656*** -1.675***
(0.512) (0.512)
Presidential System 3.996 3.946
(3.287) (3.313)
Constant 14.906** 16.861***
(5.683) (5.709)
N 298 298
R2 0.715 0.717
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
bent vote share. Substantively speaking, the findings suggest that for each point
increase in polarization, incumbent vote share decreases by .38% percent. However,
we should keep in mind that positive values of polarization indicate a difference of
ideological positions for parties that are on the same side of the midpoint of the
10-point left-right scale. Similarly, the lowest value of polarization, -6.2, represents
the highest polarization for the parties on different sides of the midpoint. Thus, the
negative and significant effect of polarization suggests that when parties are on the
same side of ideological space, the incumbent vote share decreases. When polar-
ization is negative, incumbent vote share increases. The opponent strength has a
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negative effect on incumbent vote share as well which is in line with our theoretical
expectation. Nonetheless, it is not statistically significant at 0.05 level.
Model 2 includes the interaction of opponent strength and polarization. It has a
negative effect on the incumbent vote share which provides evidence for the fourth
hypothesis that polarization (positive) has a significant negative effect on incumbent
vote share when the opponent’s electoral strength is higher. In other words, as
polarization decreases and becomes negative, which should indeed be read as an
increase in polarization for two parties who are on different sides of ideological
space, the incumbent vote share increases. Because the parties that are located on
the same side of ideological space are more likely recognized as alternatives, but
not the party located at on the other side of the incumbent’s. For positive values
of polarization, incumbent vote share decreases as opponent strength is high. This
would also enhance the party’s likelihood of being received by the electorate as a
credible alternative to the incumbent.
Figure 2.8 The Average Marginal Effects of Polarization and Opponent Strength on
Incumbent Vote Share
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Note: The colored area indicates 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=298).
In order to better interpret the results of the interactive model, Figure 2.8 graphically
illustrates how the marginal effect of polarization (opponent strength) varies across
the in-sample range of opponent strength (polarization). Based on Model 2 in Table
2.5, Figure 2.8 shows the conditional effect of polarization across the in-sample range
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of opponent strength. The marginal effect of polarization on incumbent vote share
increases as opponent strength increases. The effect of polarization is statistically
significant only when opponent strength is more than 26. To put in a different way
the marginal effect of polarization is not statistically distinguishable from 0 for the
values of opponent strength less than 26. The findings provide empirical support
for the fourth hypothesis that the marginal effect of polarization on incumbent vote
share is stronger when opponent strength is higher.
Figure 2.8 also shows the marginal effect of opponent strength for the in-sample
range of polarization. It is significant only when polarization is higher than 0. It
means that only for positive values of polarization, the effect of opponent strength
on incumbent vote share is statistically significant. In other words, when the incum-
bent and opponent party are on the same side of the ideological space, opponent
strength has a significant negative effect on incumbent vote share. This effect in-
creases as polarization increases but only for parties that are on the same side of the
ideological continuum. These findings provide empirical support for the fourth hy-
pothesis that the effect of opposition strength on incumbent vote share is stronger
when polarization is positive -i.e. when two major parties are on the same side.
This effect increases in magnitude as polarization increases. This result is also in
line with our expectation since the B term is expected to increase as polarization
increases.
2.5 Conclusion
This study addresses both empirical and theoretical limitations in the literature
on economic voting. Theoretically, the existing literature fails to account for the
substitutive effects of relative domestic and international growth on the incumbent
vote. Even though Aytaç (2018, 16) begins his article with some intriguing anecdotes
of incumbent politicians who focus in their speeches on either their international or
domestic economic growth depending on their better performance in either front, he
does not explain the relative nature of these two reference points. Building on this
puzzle, I argue that, to better understand the relationship between the economy and
electoral outcomes we should look into the relative importance of international and
domestic reference points for voters. I propose that these two sorts of comparison
are used substitutively by incumbents and found empirical support. Furthermore,
not all studies in the economic voting literature account for electoral strength and
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ideological position of the parties in their analyses. I, thus, introduce a three-way
interaction in the second model specification.
Empirically, by comparing the incumbent vote shares with several datasets such as
ParlGov (Doring and Manows 2018) and Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2017),
I recoded the incumbent vote share. Moreover, the question of how voters take into
account previous economic outcomes when evaluating the current economic perfor-
mance is not clear. Thus, alternative measures to the key independent variables,
relative domestic and international growth, are introduced.
I believe that the recognition of substitutive effects of the domestic and interna-
tional economic reference points along with the electoral strength and ideological
position of the parties is a theoretical contribution to the study of economic voting.
This study constitutes only one aspect of a broader research agenda. One of the
most intriguing research avenues is looking into voters’ reference points through an
individual-level analysis by using survey data. During the same incumbency term,
some voters perceive economic performance as good and some others consider it as
bad. Which factors shape their perceptions when they evaluate the economy? What
is the effect of party identification on incumbent vote share across the observed range
of economic performance? Does voters’ stronger party identification in a country
intensify the effects of economic factors due to their biased perception? Does the
ideological position of the incumbent party matter for holding them as responsible
for the economic outcomes? In order to answer some of those questions, I conduct
micro-level analyses in the next chapter, where individuals’ economic evaluations are
used to predict incumbent support after controlling for the partisan commitments
and ideological positions of the individual survey respondents. The main focus in
micro-level analyses is the individuals’ assessments of the current economy over the
12 months prior to the collection of survey data. This does not directly allow us
making a comparison of the macro- and micro-level of determinants of economic vot-
ing due to a lack of information regarding individuals’ domestic and international
reference points in evaluating the incumbent’s competence but, nonetheless, allows
us to draw inferences about micro-level motives of economic voting.
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3. ECONOMIC VOTING IN TURKEY
Since the first competitive multi-party elections in 1950, a total of 19 general elec-
tions were held in Turkey. A bunch of studies in the earlier literature present de-
scriptive and aggregate level examinations of voting behavior (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 160),
whereas the number of individual-level studies has been increasing in recent decades
(Toros 2014, 1011). Although the empirical studies on voting behavior are on the
rise, there are some contradictory results regarding economic voting in Turkey in
the previous literature. For instance, the traditional economic voting hypotheses,
that individuals’ economic evaluations about the past affect their vote choice, found
support in Toros’s (2014) study of the 2002 elections and Kalaycıoğlu’s (2010) study
of the 2007 elections. However, in examining the 1999 elections Esmer (2002) found
no impact, and Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) found a secondary, small impact of
voter evaluations of economic conditions on party choice. Therefore, this chapter
aims to re-examine the factors that shape party preferences in Turkey by looking at
the most recent general elections, the June 2015 and June 2018 elections.
Since November 2002, the conservative AK Party has dominated the electoral scene
in Turkey. There are two main concerns in the earlier literature regarding the fac-
tors affecting incumbent party support which are individuals’ ideological positions
and their evaluations of the government’s economic performance. Hence, the ob-
jective of this chapter is reviewing whether the long-term ideological or short-term
pragmatic concerns as well as the incumbent partisanship influence voting behavior,
along with providing a comparative assessment of the incumbent AK Party support
in the two most recent general elections. All analyses are based on the post-election
surveys conducted shortly after the election dates. The analyses show that all the
aforementioned factors are significant determinants of voting behavior. The incum-
bent partisanship and left-right ideological positions have significant effects in both
elections, while the economic performance evaluations have been important only for
the 2018 election and the effect is largely conditional on the ideological position of
voters.
In this chapter, first, the previous literature on Turkish electoral behavior will be
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briefly reviewed. Second, some major findings from the previous literature concern-
ing the center-periphery cleavage and the economic voting hypothesis in Turkey will
be presented. Then, I will introduce the hypotheses derived from my theory and
demonstrate the main empirical results concerning the effects of economic evalua-
tions on electoral preferences of individual voters in the most recent Turkish general
elections in 2015 and 2018 by using individual-level from the CSES data. In the
final section, I will discuss the main implications of my findings.
3.1 The Determinants of Voting Behavior in Turkey
Çarkoğlu (2012b, 160) notes that previous studies on voting behavior in Turkey point
out the sui generis character of Turkish elections. Electoral studies on Turkey are
not consistent with the cutting-edge political science research (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 160),
thus, the major theoretical discussions presented elsewhere may not be applicable to
the Turkish case. Three reasons are cited: the repeated military interventions in the
country, the limited influence of the rational choice approaches within the political
science community in Turkey, and lastly, the lack of data and methodological so-
phistication concerning empirical/quantitative analysis in the field (Çarkoğlu 2012b,
160). Regarding the last reason, it is stated that for a long time the comparable
individual-level data were not available for long term data analysis because of lack
of institutional funding and permanent academic team to manage data collection at-
tempts (Çarkoğlu 2012b,160-61). Moreover, existing research on the available data
remained largely descriptive unlike the Western political science literature, which
is predominantly quantitative with a particular focus on theoretical concerns and
hypothesis tests (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 161).
In these respects, two main concerns in shaping voters’ preferences, ideological cleav-
ages and economic evaluations in the previous literature will be outlined below with
their possible application to Turkish voting analyses.
3.1.1 Ideological Cleavages and Turkish Voting Behavior
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Both spatial and Michigan voting models can be applicable to the Turkish case and
supported within Mardin’s (1973) framework of center-periphery cleavage (Çarkoğlu
2012b, 161-62). According to the spatial model, the distance between individuals’
ideal positions along the left-right spectrum and the perceived positions of the parties
helps explain the vote choice of people. Such kind of a distance measure was first
used by Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000, 112-18). The authors confirm the expectation
that as the distance between the ideal point of individual and the party’s perceived
positions increases, casting a ballot for the party in question is likely to decrease.
Based on survey data collected in 2001, about a year and a half prior to the 2002
elections, Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) suggest a spatial interpretation of issue space
in Turkey. In their two-dimensional space, the first dimension is a reflection of the
center-periphery cleavage in Turkish politics in which the left corresponds to a sec-
ularist position and the right overlaps with the pro-Islamist stance. These positions
are shaped around the religious issues. The second dimension, the positions are
shaped around the social and economic reforms in the country. Individuals who
support the European Union (EU) reforms and who are Turkish nationalists consti-
tute the two opposite ends of the second dimension. Through this two-dimensional
space model, Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) successfully differentiate party positions
as well.
Furthermore, voters of the same party generally share common demographic char-
acteristics such as age, gender, socio-economic group, ethnicity, religious identity,
and ideological beliefs, which largely influence the Turkish electoral behavior lit-
erature (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 162). Following the so-called Michigan school (Campell
et al. 1960), scholars have used a model that heavily relies on party attachments,
in reference to the so-called funnel of causality. According to the model, voters’
information gathering and processing are closely related to their party identification
(PID). PID, which is defined as an outcome of the family influence in early childhood
and youth, shapes their perceptions and party preferences. It creates a process in
which voters are attracted or repelled toward certain parties, thus, generates biased
considerations (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 162). According to the model, vote preferences are
formed in the early political socialization process and are hard to change.
However, it seems that Turkish voting behavior differs from the Michigan model in
one respect. In Turkey, we may not talk about the long-term party identification
since there is no party that existed throughout the entire multiparty election period,
without some sort of an interruption (e.g., party closures or military interventions)
(Çarkoğlu 2012b, 162). Nonetheless, it is stated in literature that the reference to
PID is made through a party family identification rather than a single party one
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(Çarkoğlu 2012b, 162).
3.1.1.1 Center-Periphery Cleavage
Categorizing parties in accordance with their origins is the first approach that Mair
and Mudde (1998) examine. In this approach, parties are grouped based on the
historical conditions that gave rise to them as well as the type of interests they
represent. This is closely related to the center-periphery cleavage, which is explained
in Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal study (1967). Mardin (1973) introduced the center-
periphery cleavage for the first time to the study of Turkish politics. Çarkoğlu and
Hinich (2006) claim that the dominant secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage in Turkey
is a reflection of the center-periphery divide and, in some respects, it has common
characteristics with the Left-Right (L-R) policy space in Western party systems.
The center-periphery cleavage and the “church-state” cleavage constitute the main
cleavages in Turkey around which the party system has evolved. According to
Özbudun (2013), however, the center-periphery cleavage in Turkey is distinctive
in terms of representing an opposing relationship between the rulers and the ruled,
rather than being a mere geographical division as originally presented by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967). This division has a historical root, which emerged during the Ot-
toman era when the center had represented the ruling circle consisted of the imperial
house and its many allies, and the periphery had contained of various ethnic and
religious groups that were excluded from the ruling group (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 162).
Furthermore, Çarkoğlu (2018, 7) notes that “a ‘center’ with its modernizing univer-
salist value basis largely overlaps with the left, while local traditionalist parochialism
of the ‘periphery’ largely intersects with the right within the conventional L-R frame-
work.” This division represents a cultural divide, which has remained similar and
continued to shape Turkish politics since the Republican period (Çarkoğlu 2012b,
162). Hence, in previous literature, it is expected that ‘centrist’ parties represent
religiosity and ethnic minorities less, and appeal more to urban voters. However,
more religious and lesser educated electorates are attracted to the ‘peripheral’ parties
(Çarkoğlu 2012b, 163).
3.1.1.2 Previous Empirical Studies on Center-Periphery Cleavage
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In the earlier voting behavior literature, the first systematic study of Turkish elec-
toral behavior was conducted prior to the 1977 general election by Ergüder and
Özgediz (Çarkoğlu 2007, 258). In order to differentiate major parties’ constituen-
cies, they used a left-right scale (Ergüder 1980-81). Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006,
2008) also point to that left-right is the dominant dimension in Turkish politics.
However, Çarkoğlu (2007, 258) also notes that a single dimensional left-right de-
piction of the ideological space is questionable, and a multidimensional framework
better explains the ideological competition in the Turkish party system. The first
dimension represents the center-periphery cleavages, and the second dimension is
for ethnic cleavages based on Turkish and Kurdish identities (Çarkoğlu 2007, 258).
In 1977 data, Ergüder and Özgediz found that ethnicity, religiosity, occupational cat-
egories, and education level were helpful in differentiating the parties’ constituencies,
which is in line with the center-periphery framework (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 163). For in-
stance, voters of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) consisted of mostly workers
and civil servants in addition to those who were younger and with higher education
levels (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 163). Moreover, 79 % of people who stated that they did not
pray on a daily basis along with 55 % of those whose mother tongue was not Turkish
were CHP voters (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 163). In sum, Ergüder and Özgediz (1980-81)
successfully showed the extent to which the center-periphery cleavage shaped elec-
toral preferences in 1977.
Using the 1990 World Values Survey (WVS), a nationwide representative sample,
Esmer (1995) found that variations within left-right placement, education, and reli-
giosity, as well as the attitudes toward gender issues, indicate the differences across
parties (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 163).
With respect to the 1999 elections, there were two studies: a pre-election survey of
Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) and a post-election survey of Esmer (2002). According
to their findings, self-placement on the left-right ideological scale was statistically
significant for all party constituencies (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 164). What is important
to us, it is reported that voter evaluations of economic conditions have no impact
on vote choice in Esmer’s (2002) study and have a secondary impact in the study
of Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000). Furthermore, religiosity was found as a significant
variable distinguishing the pro-Islamist party constituencies in both studies. Kalay-
cıoğlu (1994) also use the religiosity measure to operationalize the center-periphery
divide by using the 1990 WVS data. He was the first to associate the center-
periphery framework of Mardin (1973) with the party choice (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 164).
These empirical findings suggest that religiosity has a significant effect on party
choice (Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 421). Centrist voters were more likely to have low reli-
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giosity levels while peripheral voters tend to have higher religiosity levels (Çarkoğlu
2012b, 164). Following a similar approach in his 1994 study, Kalaycıoğlu used the
1997 WVS data and reported that historical-cultural factors have a significant effect,
rather than socio-economic factors, on party choice (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 164).
3.1.2 Economic Voting in Previous Literature
Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar (2004, 2005) used the 2002 Turkish Social,
Economic, and Political Research Foundation (Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal
Araştırmalar Vakfi - TÜSES) pre-election data, and found that 88 percent of re-
spondents believed that the economy had gotten worse over the 12 months prior to
the collection of survey data. This is however not surprising when the effects of the
2001 financial crisis on the Turkish economy are recalled. Nonetheless, there was
not any evaluation in Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar’s (2004, 2005) study
regarding respondents’ attribution of responsibility for the economic condition of
the country (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 165).
As another important issue, Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar (2005, 553)
showed some future evaluations regarding economic developments: 92 percent of
respondents reported that their family’s economic condition would worsen over the
following year. However, in Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu’s (2007, 142-52) data which
were collected six months after the TÜSES study, an increase was observed in pos-
itive prospective evaluations at the time of the 2002 general elections.
As a critical issue for this study, the economic voting hypothesis may find support
in the case of Turkish electoral behavior in the analyses based on the survey data
collected prior to the 2002 general elections. However, the effects of the 2001 fi-
nancial crisis on the Turkish economy should not be ignored (Çarkoğlu 2012b, 166).
Moreover, Çarkoğlu (2012b, 166) notes that when the nature of economic voting
hypothesis, which requires the responsibility attribution concerning economic devel-
opments to the government by voters, was disregarded in the analyses, the economic
evaluations of voters per se would not be useful determinant in explaining the vote
choice.
Nonetheless, in the studies of both Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar (2004,
2005), and Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007), the aim was differentiating the ma-
jor parties’ constituencies from each other rather than testing the economic vot-
ing hypotheses. Hence, their findings suggested that the issue position variables
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have larger effects than the economic evaluations on profiling party constituencies
(Çarkoğlu 2012b, 167).
Using the 2003 data, Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar (2009) observe some
changes in voter profiles. For instance, 62.4 % of the respondents reported AK
Party as the party they identify with (Başlevent et al. 2009, 380). According
to the findings, economic evaluations have a positive effect on AK Party support
(Çarkoğlu 2012b, 167). Furthermore, by employing survey data collected before
the 2007 elections, Çarkoğlu (2008) addressed which factor, economic evaluations
or ideological background, is having a more salient effect on vote decision. By
comparing the results with those of 2002, he reported that economic evaluations
were more significant than ideological predispositions in the 2007 elections (Çarkoğlu
2012b, 167).
3.2 Theory
Two competing influences are discussed in the Turkish electoral behavior: one is
about long-term ideological orientations, and the other is about short-term economic
evaluations of voters (Çarkoğlu 2012a, 513; Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 30). Therefore, in this
second empirical chapter of this thesis, the aim is to re-examine the effects of these
factors on voting for the incumbent party in the most recent two Turkish general
elections in 2015 and 2018 by using available part of the CSES data, the nationwide
representative surveys.
The incumbent AK Party, which has been in government since the November 2002
elections, has managed to win every election with a significant electoral margin.
What is noteworthy here is that whether we can relate the AK Party’s success to
long-term ideological orientations and partisanship of voters or to the AK Party’s
relatively good macroeconomic performance as the incumbent party. The AK Party
was established in 2001 as a conservative party with strong Islamist references and
its founders, who are called as the “Young Turks” were within the movement of
the political Islamist National Outlook (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 29-30). Hence, the AK
Party’s electoral victories were related to its religious stand by some scholars and in
the international media (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 30).
However, in general, the studies of the Turkish voting behavior since the 1990s con-
centrate on two major phenomena, ideological orientation and economic prospects,
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in shaping Turkish voters’ party preferences (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 30). This is a two-
stage process: in the first one, voters’ preferences are shaped by the ideological
factors, and the economic prospects or cost-benefit calculations dominate the sec-
ond stage in forming their vote choices (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 31). Consequently, it is
stated that voters would likely to make their party choice without entering the sec-
ond stage, where the cost – benefit calculations are made, and simply act upon their
ideological orientation (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 31). However, the ideological position on
the left-right spectrum does not always explain vote preferences. Sometimes, the
voter needs to make a further evaluation between parties and votes on the basis
of the economic conditions (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, 31-32). Therefore, in order to un-
derstand which factors are overwhelmingly effective in shaping the vote choice of
individuals, the following hypothesis will be tested.
H5: Controlling for voters’ ideological orientations, the effect of voters’ economic
evaluations on incumbent party support is positive and significant.
However, the effect of voters’ economic evaluations should be conditional on their
ideological distance to the incumbent party. The so-called ‘projection effects’ is
simply about that voters pull parties/candidates they like closer to their personal
ideal position, while they push candidates/parties they dislike further away (Grand
and Tiemann 2013, 497). As a result, voters whose ideological positions overlap
with the AK Party, or who place themselves far from the AK Party would likely
to perceive economy based on their party identifications. For instance, when the
ideological distance between the voter and the incumbent party is close to 0, then
s/he is likely to perceive the country’s economy as in good shape. However, when
the perceived distance between the voter and the incumbent party is at its higher
level, then the voter is more likely to evaluate the economic conditions as bad. This
is explained in the literature in two different ways. The first one is mentioned above,
originated from the PID, which can become a biased filter of evaluation (Çarkoğlu
2012b, 162). Those with strong partisanship are unlikely to change their party
choice, while individuals with low PID more easily shift their party choices (Çarkoğlu
2012b, 162). Second, it is noted that the adverse evaluations of economic policy
performance is one of the characteristics of the “Left” “Right”, on the other hand, is
characterized by more trusting and happy individuals who side with the maintenance
of the status-quo (Çarkoğlu 2007, 268). Hence, it is expected that economic voting
theory works well for individual voters placing themselves in the midpoint of the
ideological scale since they are expected to have relatively more neutral evaluations
regarding the incumbent’s competence and to be free from the effects of the so-called
projection bias that arises from the stronger partisan attitudes.
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H6: The marginal effect of voters’ economic evaluations on voting for the incumbent
party is positive and significant, when ideological distance with the incumbent party
is at higher values.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data
My two hypotheses on Turkish voting behavior will be tested using two survey
studies from the CSES Modules 4 and 5, collected shortly after the June 2015 and
June 2018 general elections. The reason of choosing these two survey studies is
related to the aim of comparing the empirical findings regarding Turkish electoral
behavior in two different general elections as well as addressing the most recent
general elections. The earlier CSES modules were not examined here since they
do not include the same questions, if any, for the state of economy questions. The
sample size in the CSES Module 4 for the 2015 Turkish general elections is 1086,
and the number of respondents in the CSES Module 5 for the 2018 Turkish general
elections is 1051.
3.3.2 Variables
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the analyses is the respondent’s vote choice for party list
in the November 2015 and the June 2018 Turkish elections. In the original dataset,
it is a categorical variable taking the value of 1 for AK Party, 2 for CHP, 3 for MHP,
4 for HDP, 5 for SP, 90 for the others, 92 for the invalid ballot, 97 for “No Answer”,
98 for “Don’t Know”, and 99 for the missing case (the options from 92 to 99 are
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excluded from the analyses). These answers are recoded into a dummy variable. In
contrast to earlier works, party preferences are operationalized in a binary fashion,
where 1 indicates the vote choice for the incumbent party, AK Party, and 0 denotes
the votes for all other parties. This is because the main focus in this thesis is on the
incumbent vote, rather than differentiating major parties’ constituencies.
3.3.2.2 Independent Variables
Economic Voting
In order to assess subjective economic perceptions of respondents, a question is asked
in two survey studies. Retrospective sociotropic evaluations are derived from the
survey question “would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the
economy in Turkey has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” The
options of “gotten better”, “stayed the same”, and “gotten worse” are common in
both datasets. However, the CSES survey for the 2018 elections, include a larger
option scale including “gotten somewhat better” and “gotten somewhat worse”. The
answers to this question are recoded into a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5
where 1 stands for “gotten worse” and 5 stands for “gotten better”. Another survey
question allows us to assess for the presence of prospective economic voting in the
CSES Module 5, which is “over the next ten years or so, how likely or unlikely
is it that you will improve your standard of living? Very likely, somewhat likely,
somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely?” However, this question will not be used in
our analyses, since there is no information regarding the same attitude in the CSES
Module 4.
Sociodemographic and Economic Factors
Sociodemographic variables consist of gender, age, education level, and settlement
type. Gender is a dummy variable that denotes females as 1 and males as 0. Age is
a continuous variable and ranges from 17 to 90. The age-squared is also included in
all models assuming that the effect of age is non-linear. In other words, the effect
of age on incumbent vote could be negative up until, let’s say, the age of 35, then
positive until 50, and negative again thereafter. As a result, adding the age-squared
variable to the models allows us to capture more accurately the non-linear effect of
age. The settlement, rural or urban residence, variable takes values of 1 for large
town or city, 0 for the rural area, village, small or middle-sized town, and suburbs
of the large town. Education level is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 6.
0 is assigned to those with no education, 1 to primary school graduate, 2 to lower
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secondary graduate, 3 to upper secondary graduate, 4 to university graduate, 5 to
those with a master’s degree, and 6 to those having a doctoral degree. Income is
our socioeconomic variable and measured as quintiles where 1 indicates the lowest
household income quintile and 5 the highest household income quintile.
Identity
Attendance to religious services is measured using a 6-point scale. The options are
never, once a year, two to eleven times a year, once a month, two or more times a
month, once a week or more than once a week. This is one of the most commonly
used measures of religious attitudes in survey research (Kempf-Leonard 2004, 373).
Furthermore, for the ethnic identity, the question of which language is usually spoken
at home is used. Language is a binary variable where 1 indicates those who speak
Kurdish at home, and 0 indicates other languages.
Party Identification and Ideological Distance
The question of which party respondents feel closest to is employed to measure the
partisanship along with the statement on the degree of closeness to the party in
question. Since our aim is to explain incumbent party vote, the former question is
recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates to those who report that they feel
closest to the incumbent party, the AK Party. As a result, the degree of closeness
provides us with the information about the extent to which a respondent feels close
to the AK Party, which can take values of 1 for very close, and 0 for somewhat close
or not very close. Moreover, the questions of “where would you place the AK Party,
incumbent party, on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the
right?” and “where would you place yourself on this scale?” are used in order to
measure individuals’ self placements and placements of the incumbent party. The
ideological distance measure is created by taking the difference between the mean
reported ideological position of the AK Party (8.44 and 8.5 in the 2015 and the 2018
elections). The reason for taking the mean ideological position of the AK Party is
related to our aim to cancel out projection bias inherent in survey data. However,
the perceived ideological distance variable is also generated by taking the difference
in reported positions of self and the AK Party, and presented in the appendix.
3.4 Empirical Findings
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All models which are presented in Table 3.1 are estimated via logistic regression.
Model 1 includes all the socio-demographic and economic, identity related, and
ideological distance variables. The effect of ideological distance on incumbent vote is
negative and statistically significant. As the ideological distance between a voter and
the incumbent party increases, incumbent support decreases. With respect to socio-
demographic and economic variables, education level has a negative and statistically
significant effect on voting for the AK Party. Model 1 shows that when the level of
education decreases the AK Party support increases. In other words, lowly educated
tends to vote for AK Party. The effect of income is also negative and significant,
which means that the AK Party is more popular among those who belong to lower
household income quintiles. Furthermore, female voters are significantly more likely
to prefer the AK Party than male voters do. In terms of identity related variables,
religiosity has a positive and significant effect on AK Party support. More religious
voters tend to vote for the incumbent party. The language spoken at home has a
negative and significant effect on the incumbent vote as well. Voters who speak
Kurdish at home tend to not vote for the AK Party. Overall, all the results derived
from Model 1 are in line with the previous literature (e.g., Çarkoğlu 2012b; Çarkoğlu
2018; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000; Ergüder 1980-81; Esmer 2002; Kalaycıoğlu 1994).
Model 2 aims to test the fifth hypothesis. The effect of voters’ economic evaluations
on incumbent party support is positive and significant. Indeed, Model 2 indicates
that those who report that the state of economy has gotten worse tend to vote for
other parties, while those who find the economy gotten better over the previous 12
months are significantly more likely to vote for the AK Party. However, Model 3
presents contradictory results to the specified hypothesis. Incumbent partisanship
and degree of partisanship appeared as possible confounding variables in Model 3.
Not only the relationship between the economic voting variable and incumbent vote
vanishes when the incumbent partisanship and degree of partisanship are controlled
for, but also all the socio-demographic and economic, and identity related variables
on the incumbent vote become insignificant. Hence, the conclusion is that the effects
of all the independent variables except for the ideological distance are likely to be
mediated by partisanship, which makes the hypothesized relationship a spurious
one.
Model 3 also introduces the interaction of incumbent partisanship and degree of par-
tisanship. Figure 3.1 illustrates the effects of incumbent partisanship on incumbent
vote for the in-sample range of degree of partisanship. In the first case, incumbent
partisanship equals to 0, which indicates those who state that they feel not close to
AK Party but to some other party, the probability of voting for the incumbent is at
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Table 3.1 The Effects of Economic Evaluations, Ideological Distance, and Partisan
Commitments on Incumbent Party Vote
Model.1 Model.2 Model.3 Model.4
Incumbent Vote
Economic Evaluations × 0.256***
Ideological Distance (0.079)
Economic Evaluations 0.752*** 0.075 -0.422**
(0.073) (0.149) (0.215)
Ideological Distance -0.688*** -0.612*** -0.341*** -0.969***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.105) (0.251)
Incumbent Partisanship 9.914*** 10.128***
(1.246) (1.289)
Degree of Partisanship 0.831* 0.896*
(0.455) (0.466)
Incumbent Partisanship × -2.233*** -2.255***
Degree of Partisanship (0.614) (0.630)
Education -0.290*** -0.267*** -0.156 -0.145
(0.085) (0.092) (0.177) (0.182)
Religiosity 0.210*** 0.193*** 0.111 0.111
(0.050) (0.055) (0.102) (0.106)
Income -0.134** -0.172** 0.123 0.109
(0.064) (0.071) (0.137) (0.139)
Gender 0.375** 0.462** -0.241 -0.217
(0.166) (0.181) (0.366) (0.371)
Age -0.020 -0.017 0.014 0.012
(0.031) (0.033) (0.059) (0.060)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Language -1.040*** -0.713* -0.191 -0.188
(0.352) (0.368) (0.816) (0.904)
Urban Residence -0.012 -0.186 -0.145 -0.153
(0.167) (0.183) (0.353) (0.360)
2018 Election=1 0.417** 0.153 0.178 0.242
(0.166) (0.183) (0.366) (0.372)
Constant 2.413*** 0.588 -3.948** -2.808
(0.741) (0.815) (1.794) (1.831)
N 1062 1062 1062 1062
Pseudo-R2 0.352 0.440 0.803 0.809
Log-likelihood -476.297 -412.092 -145.027 -140.131
AIC 974.594 848.184 320.055 312.261
BIC 1029.241 907.799 394.573 391.748
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
its lowest level. However, among those who state that they feel closest to AK Party,
the probability of incumbent vote dramatically increases. When voters report to
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feel closest to AK Party but not really very close, the probability of voting for the
incumbent decreases but it is not a substantial decrease.
Figure 3.1 The Effect of Incumbent Partisanship on Incumbent Vote
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Note: The graph illustrates the marginal effect of incumbent partisanship on incumbent vote for
different levels of partisanship.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predictions calculated from conditional
standard errors. (N=1062).
Furthermore, when the partisanship variables are included, the AIC value dramat-
ically drops from 848 to 320. The smaller AIC value in Model 3 indicates that the
Model 3 is the preferable model and provides the better fit. In addition, a likelihood
ratio (lr) test is used. Model 3 is considered as the full model, and a model nested
in Model 3 is generated by imposing restrictions on the parameters of the Model 3
which are reported in Table 3.2. The first model drops economic evaluation variable
from the model. The output of lr test gives the chi-squared value for the test (0.60)
as well as the p-value for a chi-squared of 0.60 with one degree of freedom. De-
grees of freedom in lr test indicates the number of parameters that are constrained
(i.e., dropped from the model), which is the economic evaluation variable here. The
result of the lr test shows that adding the economic evaluation variable does not
provide a statistically significant improvement in model fit. The Wald test also ex-
amines whether restricting some parameters seriously harms the fit of the model,
which also suggests the same conclusion. Based on a p-value of 0.44, we are not
able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for economic evaluation is not
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Table 3.2 The Effect of Economic Evaluations on Incumbent Vote
Model.1 Model.2
Incumbent Vote
Economic Evaluations 0.075
(0.149)
Incumbent Partisanship × -2.269*** -2.233***
Degree of Partisanship (0.612) (0.614)
Incumbent Partisanship 10.065*** 9.914***
(1.218) (1.246)
Degree of Partisanship 0.835* 0.831*
(0.457) (0.455)
Ideological Distance -0.349*** -0.341***
(0.104) (0.105)
Education -0.158 -0.156
(0.176) (0.177)
Religiosity 0.114 0.111
(0.102) (0.102)
Income 0.130 0.123
(0.137) (0.137)
Gender -0.249 -0.241
(0.365) (0.366)
Age 0.016 0.014
(0.059) (0.059)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Language -0.092 -0.072
(0.837) (0.832)
Urban Residence -0.175 -0.195
(0.358) (0.361)
2018 Election=1 0.204 0.178
(0.362) (0.366)
Constant -3.875** -3.948**
(1.792) (1.794)
N 1062 1062
Pseudo-R2 0.803 0.803
Log-likelihood -145.154 -145.027
AIC 318.308 320.055
BIC 387.859 394.573
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
different from zero, meaning that including economic evaluation variable does not
statistically significantly improve the fit of the model to the CSES data.
Model 4 introduces the interaction term of voters’ economic evaluations and ideo-
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Figure 3.2 The Average Marginal Effect of Economic Evaluations on Incumbent Vote
for Different Levels of Incumbent Partisanship
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Note: The graph illustrates average marginal effect of voters’ economic evaluations on incumbent
vote across the in-sample range of ideological distance for voters with strong and weak incumbent
partisanship.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect calculated from
conditional standard errors (N=1062).
logical distance from AK Party. Figures 3.2 and 3.4 graphically illustrate how the
marginal effect of voters’ economic evaluations (ideological distance) varies across
the in-sample range of ideological distance (economic evaluations). Figure 3.2 illus-
trates the effect of economic evaluations on incumbent vote for voters who state that
they feel closest to the incumbent party. For voters who feel closest to AK Party, the
effect of economic evaluations on the AK Party vote is positive and significant only
for those who place themselves far from the AK Party’s ideological position. This
effect is stronger for those who have weaker partisanship commitments toward the
AK Party. For those who place themselves at 5 or to its left of the ideological scale
and those who have weaker commitments toward the AK Party, the effect of eco-
nomic evaluations on incumbent vote is positive and statistically significant. More
specifically, economic voting does not work for stronger partisans but works well for
those who have weaker partisan commitments. However, the number of incumbent
partisans who place themselves at 5 or to its left of the midpoint of the ideologi-
cal scale are very few. Therefore, substantively speaking, such effect of economic
evaluations on incumbent vote is not a meaningful one.
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Figure 3.3 The Average Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance on Incumbent Vote
for Varied Economic Evaluations
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Note: The graph illustrates the average marginal effect of voters’ economic evaluations on
incumbent vote across the in-sample range of economic evaluation for voters with strong and
weak incumbent partisanship.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predictions calculated from conditional
standard errors (N=1062).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the average marginal effect of ideological distance with the
AK Party on incumbent vote across the in-sample range of economic evaluations.
For weaker incumbent partisans who perceive that the state of economy has gotten
much worse and somewhat worse, ideological position has a negative and significant
effect. For stronger incumbent partisans, the negative effect is significant only for
those who state that the economy has gotten much worse. This explains partisan
commitments are more important for strong AK Party partisans rather than weak
AK Party partisans.
Figure 3.4 on the other hand, illustrates the effect of economic evaluations on in-
cumbent vote for voters who state that they feel closest to another party than the
incumbent AK Party. For such voters, the effect of economic evaluations on the
AK Party vote is positive, however, not significant for any value of ideological dis-
tance. In other words, partisanship commitments for other party partisans are more
important than their economic evaluations in shaping their vote preferences.
Additionally, Figure 3.5 presents an intriguing nuance regarding the effect of eco-
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Figure 3.4 The Average Marginal Effect of Economic Evaluations on Incumbent Vote
for Other Party Partisans
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Note: The graph illustrates the average marginal effect of voters’ economic evaluations on
incumbent vote across the in-sample range of ideological distance for voters with strong and weak
other party partisanship.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect calculated from
conditional standard errors (N=1062).
nomic evaluations on incumbent vote in different election years. It demonstrates
that the average marginal effect of economic evaluations on incumbent vote for vot-
ers with weak partisanship commitments toward the incumbent or other parties in
the two Turkish elections examined here based on Table A.7 in the appendix. Both
figures show similar patterns, -i.e., as the ideological distance increases the positive
effect of economic evaluations increases, as expected. When there is no difference
between the ideological positions of voters and that of the incumbent party, the
economic voting hypothesis does not work. When the ideological distance is at its
higher levels, the effect of the economic evaluations is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in both elections only for weak incumbent partisans. Among other party
partisans with weaker commitments, the positive effect is only significant in the 2018
elections and for voters who place themselves at 1 or 2 on the ideological scale.
The effect of economic evaluations on incumbent vote is stronger in the 2018 elections
in general. In the 2018 elections, when the macroeconomic conditions in Turkey had
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Figure 3.5 The Average Marginal Effect of Economic Evaluation on Incumbent Vote
for Voters with Weak Partisanhip Commitments toward Incumbent or Other Party
in Different Election Times
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
A
ve
ra
ge
 M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f E
co
no
m
ic
 E
va
lu
at
io
ns
 6.5.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5
Ideological Distance
Weak Incumbent Partisanship
0
10
20
30
40
P
er
ce
nt
-.1
0
.1
.2
A
ve
ra
ge
 M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f E
co
no
m
ic
 E
va
lu
at
io
ns
 .5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5
Ideological Distance
Weak Other Party Partisanship
0
5
10
15
20
P
er
ce
nt
Election-year=2015 Election-year=2018
Note: The graph illustrates the average marginal effect of voters’ economic evaluations on
incumbent vote for different values of ideological distance in different elections.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect calculated from
conditional standard errors (N=1062).
considerably worsened1 the effect is statistically significant for voters with weaker
incumbent partisanship commitments and for those who place themselves at 5 or
to its left on the ideological continuum. However, as noted above, the number of
incumbent partisans with a leftist ideology are very few. As a result, we are not able
to confidently reject the null that there is no effect of voters’ economic evaluations on
voting for the incumbent party. All in all, the findings provide only limited evidence
for the sixth hypothesis that the effect of economic evaluations on incumbent vote
is positive and significant, when the ideological distance with the incumbent party
is at higher values.
3.5 Conclusion
1Carlotta Gall, “Turkey Enters Recession, a Blow for Erdogan as Elections Near,” The New York Times,
March 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/business/turkey-recession.html
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Available nationally representative survey data on Turkey collected shortly after
the 2015 and 2018 elections, and with the same question wording, provide us with
an opportunity to compare the salience of economic evaluations in different elec-
toral environments. The influence of negative economic evaluations on incumbent
support seems insignificant in both contexts when partisanship is controlled for.
Similarly, all other socio-demographic and economic, and identity related factors
are also insignificant. These results suggest that voting for the incumbent party is
contingent on individual voters’ party identification, which is in line with the previ-
ous literature (e.g., Çarkoğlu 2012b; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000; Esmer 2002). More
specifically, individuals’ evaluations concerning the government’s economic perfor-
mance are likely to be parallel to their feelings toward the incumbent party, thus,
their economic evaluations are biased, especially those of individuals with stronger
partisan attitudes.
However, the findings also suggest that critical economic evaluations become signifi-
cant for those with weaker partisanship commitments and whose ideological position
is distant from the incumbent party’s ideological position. This negative effect of
economic evaluations on incumbent party vote is stronger in the 2018 election and
for voters with weaker incumbent partisanship commitments. On the other hand,
the influence of economic evaluations is insignificant for the 2015 elections for other
party partisans. That is the vote for the incumbent in the 2015 elections hardly
affected by economic evaluations.
Since the same incumbent party run in the 2015 and 2018 elections, we can compare
of statistical and substantive significance of different factors shaping vote choice.
The conclusion that the incumbent vote in the 2018 election was shaped by eco-
nomic concerns only for those who have weaker incumbent partisanship commit-
ments with higher ideological distance to the incumbent party is only relevant for
very few voters. In general, the influence of long-term partisan commitments on
incumbent party support was higher than the effect of economic evaluations despite
the small nuances between the two elections. In other words, AK Party seems to
have gained its electoral support in two elections mostly from those with strong
partisan commitments.
In sum, shifting salience of short-term economic evaluations and long-term ideo-
logical orientations and partisan commitments on the incumbent vote needs more
attention in future research on Turkish electoral behavior. I hope the implications
of these findings regarding Turkish electoral behavior will be discussed in further
research. The empirical findings in this thesis suggest that the AK Party is able to
appeal to its core constituency, who has previously cast their vote for the party. The
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conservative Turkish electorate, who stands more to the right-of-the-center than to
the left, has been increasing in size, which largely affects new party preferences and
incumbent support (Çarkoğlu 2012a, 519). Since partisanship commitments tend to
change slowly, the effect of evaluations of the government’s economic performance
on vote choice crucially important in terms of electoral accountability. Electoral
accountability through the economic vote works better when the incumbent who
is held responsible for the unsatisfactory economic conditions is punished by the
electorate. However, as long as the perceptions of economic performance are shaped
by party identification and partisanship, the economic voting theory would not be
sufficient to explain voting behavior. The findings suggesting that the influence of
economic concerns on incumbent vote is significant only for very few people with
weaker incumbent partisanship commitments and when their ideological distance
with the incumbent party is high is one of the most important indicators of high
level of polarization in Turkish politics. Stronger partisans and ideologically more
polarized voters over time seem like an impediment to the functioning of electoral
accountability in Turkey. This highly polarized environment is more likely to have
shaped the party preferences in the last two general elections, thus, should be subject
to further research.
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4. CONCLUSION
Electoral accountability is essential for democracy. When governments are subject
to recurring popular elections, they govern better and watch over the well-being of
their citizens to be re-elected (Kayser and Peress 2012, 680). Economic voting is
one of the most direct evidences of electoral accountability, which implies the gov-
ernments’ dependence on the governed in democracies. According to the economic
voting theory, incumbent governments that provide poor economic outcomes will be
punished by voters at the polls. Thus, democratic theorists are reassured that the
incumbent government is assessed and controlled by people (Kayser and Peress 2012,
680). If this relationship does not work, the concerns about electoral accountability
raise (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 222-50).
Accordingly, this thesis examines the relationship between incumbent governments’
economic performance and their electoral support. We have learned from the eco-
nomic voting literature that voters electorally penalize incumbent governments on
the basis of national economic conditions. Incumbents are punished for their bad
economic performances and rewarded for the good. However, previous literature sug-
gests that for a proper understanding of this relationship between economic outcomes
and incumbent support, a domestically and internationally comparative framework
is necessary. Voters use domestic and international reference points in interpreting
economic outcomes and evaluating incumbents performance (Aytaç 2018, 17). A
given economic outcome is perceived as good or bad depending on the comparisons
voters make. Consequently, the economic voting theory is revised in such a way
that “incumbents who preside over relatively better (worse) economic outcomes in
domestic and international comparisons will be rewarded (punished) in elections”
(Aytaç 2018, 17).
Differently, from the previous literature, this thesis considers the substitutive nature
of these reference points and asks about the extent of economic voting when an in-
cumbent performs well in only one of these economic fronts, either in terms of relative
domestic economic growth or relative international economic growth. This question
constitutes the major focus of the first empirical chapter. Employing an extended
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cross-national dataset covering 501 national-level executive elections in 63 countries
from 1960 to 2017, I analyzed the substitutive effects of relatively better domestic
and international economic performances on incumbent support. Moreover, I de-
velop an argument about the necessity of a strong challenger party/candidate as an
alternative to the incumbent government accounting for the ideological divergence
of the challenger and incumbent parties. Those serve to a better and more realistic
understanding of economic voting.
In the second empirical chapter of the thesis, economic voting was tested on two most
recent Turkish parliamentary elections in 2015 and 2018 by employing individual-
level data and estimating a logistic model regression. Again, for a better and re-
alistic understanding of economic voting, the effects of partisan commitments and
the distance between the ideological position of the AK Party and ideological self
placements of voters were discussed in detail. In identifying the determinants of
voting behavior in Turkey for the 2015-2018 period, gender, age, education level,
settlement, and income level are defined as socio-demographic and socio-economic
determinants, ethnicity and religiosity as identity determinants, and retrospective
sociotropic evaluations are defined as economic voting determinants as informed by
the previous literature in Turkey.
The findings from the macro-level, cross-national study provide evidence for the first
two hypotheses that relative domestic growth (international growth) has a signifi-
cant enhancing effect on incumbent vote share when relative international growth
(domestic growth) is lower. When relative domestic growth is less than 3% per-
cent, the effect of relative international growth on incumbent vote share becomes
statistically and substantively significant, and positive. When relative international
growth is less than 3% percent, relative domestic growth has a statistically and sub-
stantively significant, and positive effect on incumbent vote share. In other words,
better relative international and domestic economic performances are more likely
to shape voters’ party preferences and to increase incumbent vote share. In brief,
the marginal effect of relative international growth (domestic growth) on incumbent
vote share declines as relative domestic growth (international growth) increases.
The findings regarding my third hypothesis show that availability of a reliable al-
ternative challenger is a condition for the electoral effect of relative domestic and
international performance. In bad economic times, the effect of opponent strength
on incumbent vote share is negative and strongest. However, this negative effect
is statistically significant only when either the relative domestic or international
growth is at their low levels. More specifically, when relative domestic growth is
1.9% percent (one standard deviation above the mean that denotes a high of rela-
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tive domestic growth level) and relative international growth is -1.73% (one standard
deviation below the mean that denotes a low level of relative international growth),
an increase in opponent strength from 20% to 40% (a two standard deviation in-
crease in opponent strength) decreases the predicted incumbent vote share by 3.5
percentage points. When relative domestic growth is -2.3% (one standard deviation
below the mean) and relative international growth is 2.5% (one standard deviation
above), a similar increase in opponent strength (from 20% to 40%) decreases the
predicted incumbent vote share by 1.9 percentage points.
The findings also provide evidence for the fourth hypothesis that polarization of
the ideological positions of two parties on the same side of the ideological space,
has a significant negative effect on incumbent vote share when opponent’s electoral
strength is higher. In other words, as polarization increases for two parties who
are on different sides of ideological space, incumbent vote share increases, on the
other hand, when polarization between two parties who are on the same side of ide-
ological continuum increases, incumbent vote share decreases since it is more likely
that voters see the alternative party as reliable. However, this effect is statistically
significant only when opponent strength is more than 26%.
With respect to the case study on Turkey using individual-level data, the main
findings reveal that we are not able to reject the null hypothesis, which states that
introducing individuals’ economic evaluations into our baseline model does not cre-
ate a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model after partisanship
commitments are controlled for. Incumbent partisanship and degree of partisan-
ship appear as possible confounding variables, which suppress not only the effects
of voters’ economic evaluations, but also the effects of socio-demographic and eco-
nomic, and identity variables on incumbent vote. More specifically, partisan atti-
tudes formed in the early political socialization process are the major determinant
in shaping voters’ party preferences. Voters are more likely to perceive the national
economic outcomes depending on their partisanship commitments. As a result, party
identification is revealed as a crucial source of individuals’ biased evaluations which
is in line with previous literature (Çarkoğlu 2012b; Campbell et al. 1960). Thus
the case study on Turkey has important implications about the inherent partisan
bias contained in survey evaluations of the economy and confirms that partisanship
tends to influence economic evaluations.
Intriguingly, the findings also indicate that economic voting is present in Turkey in
the sense that economic evaluations affect the likelihood of voting for the incumbent
party conditionally on the distance between the perceived ideological positions of
one’s self and that of the ruling AK Party. As the ideological distance increases the
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positive effect of economic evaluations on the propensity to vote for the AK Party
increases. However, for the voters whose ideological positions overlap with that of
the AK Party, economic evaluations, however, have no impact on the likelihood of
voting for the incumbent party. Those voters are most likely the core constituencies
of the AK Party and their partisanship commitments have a higher impact on their
voting propensity for the AK Party. On the contrary, individuals whose ideological
positions are far away from the AK Party are most likely left-wing party constituen-
cies. Nonetheless, there can be incumbent partisans among these voters with strong
or weak partisan attitudes. Economic evaluations have a positive and significant
impact on incumbent vote for voters with weak partisanship affiliations toward the
AK Party when they place themselves 5 or lower scale on ideological scale. However,
the number of these people is very few, hence, we can not talk about a substantive
significance of economic evaluations on incumbent vote.
In sum, ideological concerns matter for voters with weaker incumbent partisan af-
filiations, on the other hand, partisan attitudes are more important determinant
than economic evaluations in shaping other party constituencies’ vote preferences
which provide partial evidence for the sixth hypothesis that the marginal effect of
voters’ economic evaluations on incumbent vote is positive and significant when the
ideological distance between the incumbent party and the voter is at higher values.
Moreover, it is noted that this impact is stronger in the 2018 Turkish elections re-
gardless of incumbent partisan attittudes. One possible explanation for the 2015
elections might be that the CSES data were collected shortly after the June 2015
election. However, two general elections were held in Turkey in 2015. The first
was on June 7, 2015 and the second on November 1, 2015, since the previous failed
to produce a clear majority in the parliament. During the post-June election pe-
riod, the state of affairs with repeated terror attacks in many parts of the country
would likely to change voters’ perception concerning the most important problem
of the country to terrorism and security issues from economic satisfaction (Aytaç,
Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017, 14). Hence, the responses could be affected from situ-
ation at the time survey conducted. Therefore, the impact of economic evaluations
on voting for the AK Party might have varied between the two consecutive elections
which were held in the same year.
To sum up, the aim of this thesis is to provide a better and realistic understanding
of economic voting. The comparative analysis chapter addresses some empirical and
theoretical limitations in the economic voting literature. From a theoretical per-
spective, the earlier literature fails to account for the substitutive effects of relative
domestic and international growth as well as the effects of opponent strength and
polarization on incumbent vote share. Empirically speaking, the question of how
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voters’ reference points are defined is not clear in the previous literature. Thus,
theoretically guided alternative measures for the relative domestic and international
growth are introduced and respective empirical findings are presented. However,
with alternative measures of relative economic performance, the number of observa-
tions decreases due to the given limited World Bank1 2 economic data. Moreover,
cross-national data in Aytaç’s (2018) analyses are extended from 2014 to 2017 and
introduced 2 more countries which are Luxembourg and Malta. As a result, the
extended dataset employed in this thesis comprises 501 presidential and legislative
elections instead of 475. Consequently, not only the recognition of the substitutive
natures of domestic and international economic reference points and introduction of
opponent strength and polarization but also the extension of cross-national dataset
constitute the major theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis to the
economic voting literature.
In this thesis, I assume that an incumbent government frames its economic perfor-
mance in a specific way (i.e., covers the worse and highlights the better economic
outcomes on domestic and international fronts). That is, how incumbents make use
of domestic and international reference points is assumed here to vary depending on
which of those reveals a better performance.
However, a more direct explanation of the expectation that political actors strategi-
cally alter their discourse necessitates an in-depth analysis. In this respect, further
research on incumbent strategies (i.e, stressing either the domestic or international
reference point) should be supplemented with comprehensive content analyses of
incumbents’ speeches over the course of examined election campaigns. Data from
content analyses of political speeches can be used to investigate whether incumbents
actually stress their better performance on domestic and international fronts.
Consequently, I believe that further research that supplements the data on relative
domestic and international growth with those on the content and frequency of po-
litical discourse regarding domestic or international reference points would not only
help assess an important assumption this thesis makes, but also contribute to the
economic voting literature by testing the causal mechanism with more appropriate
data.
Moreover, the question of why the impacts of similar levels of economic performance
on incumbent support vary across countries and time periods might be one of the
intriguing research avenues. One possible explanation might lie in the variation of
1World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS, 2017). Available at https://wits.worldbank.org/
2World Development Indicators (WDI, 2017). Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
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democratization measures such as the existence of checks and balance mechanisms,
and a free information environment. The scope and media coverage of parties might
constitute a crucially important explanation. As MacKuen and his colleagues (1992,
605) assert, mass media is a very important source that affects voters’ expectations.
People build their expectations based on what it is told in mass media. Therefore, in
the elections where there is a weak opponent, it is relatively easy to manipulate the
news about economic and political outcomes. The information on economic perfor-
mance would be distorted as a result of unequal access to mass media during election
campaigns. The incumbent would try to be reelected by convincing the electorate
about that economy works well and will continue to do so by selecting better eco-
nomic outcomes among domestic and international reference points. As Çarkoğlu
and Yıldırım (2018, 167; 178) state in light of the Turkish example, the incumbent
president can successfully deflect the policy specific issues that can threaten his/her
electoral success and blame external actors for the poor economy. Therefore, cap-
turing the direct effect of economic developments on incumbent politicians’ electoral
support can be challenging when there is an omission of democratization measures
such as the existence of checks and balance mechanisms and a free information en-
vironment. Leader change in parties is also another important variable, which may
affect individuals’ vote preferences. Regarding media coverage and leader change,
there is a recent dataset collected in 2018 by Debus, Somer-Topçu, and Travis. How-
ever, it could not be used in this thesis since it covers only nine European countries
and between 2005 and 2015.
With regard to the case study on Turkey, there are some limitations regarding the
availability of long-term comparative data for testing the economic voting hypothe-
sis. Only one economic evaluation question available in the CSES data, it is hard to
capture the effects of voters’ retrospective economic evaluations on their vote pref-
erences. For the 2018 elections, the CSES Module 5 questionnaire is limited in the
sense that it does not include survey items on prospective pocketbook voting. More-
over, there are no questions about whether respondents hold government responsible
for the nation’s economic condition. Further research should look into voters’ evalua-
tions concerning the government’s domestic and international economic performance
by conducting a micro-individual level analysis preferably on the long-term. Over-
all, I provide here a first step toward this broad research agenda that I would like
to pursue in my doctoral research and future academic career. Further research on
which voters take domestic and international reference points differently and how
voters decide to choose which reference in evaluating the incumbent’s economic per-
formance have important consequences for our understanding of who gets elected
and what policy gets enacted.
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APPENDIX A
Data Sources of Comparative Analysis
Elecoral Variables: identification of incumbents, election results, oppo-
nent strength, polarization of parties, presence of coalition
The starting point for the construction of electoral variables was the publicly avail-
able datasets used in Aytaç(2018), which is available in the JOP Dataverse1. I
checked and extended these datasets by consulting to the following sources:
• Doring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2019. Parliaments and Governments Database
(ParlGov). Available at http://www.parlgov.org.
• Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel,
Bernhard Weßels. 2017. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2017a. Available at
https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2017a
Effective Number of Parties
• Gallagher, Michael, 2019. Election Indices Dataset. Available at
http://www.tcd.ie/PoliticalScience/people/michaelgallagher/ElSystems/index.php
Annual% GDP growth
• The primary source of information is World Development Indicators (WDI, 2017)
of the World Bank. Available at
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
Economic Variables: trade statistics
• The primary source of information is World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS,
2017) of the World Bank. Available at https://wits.worldbank.org/
1https://dataverse.harvard.edu /dataverse/jop
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Elections in the Cross National Dataset
Table A.1 List of Elections in the Cross National Dataset
Countries Election-years
Argentina 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
Australia 1966, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987,
1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
Austria 1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995,
1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017
Bangladesh 1996, 2001
Belgium 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991,
1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014
Benin 2001, 2006, 2011
Bolivia 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2009
Brazil 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
Canada 1965, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1993, 1997,
2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015
Chile 1999, 2005, 2009, 2013
Colombia 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2010, 2014
Costa Rica 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002,
2006, 2010, 2014
Denmark 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987,
1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
Dominican Republic 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012
Ecuador 1988, 1992, 1998, 2006
El Salvador 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Finland 1966, 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999,
2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
France 1969, 1981, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
Germany 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998,
2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Ghana 2004, 2008, 2012
Greece 1981, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007, 2009, 2012,
2015
Guatemala 1999, 2003, 2007
Honduras 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013
India 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999,
2004, 2009, 2014
Indonesia 2009
Ireland 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1992,
1997, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016
Israel 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999,
2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2015
Italy 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001,
2006, 2008, 2013
Jamaica 1967, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011
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Japan 1967, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1993,
1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017
Luxembourg 1999, 2009, 2013
Kenya 2007
Madagascar 1996, 2001, 2006
Malawi 2004, 2009, 2014
Malaysia 2013
Mali 2007
Malta 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2017
Mexico 2006, 2012
Netherlands 1967, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998,
2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
New Zealand 1966, 1969, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993,
1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017
Nicaragua 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011
Norway 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001,
2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Pakistan 1990, 1993, 1997
Panama 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Paraguay 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Peru 1990
Philippines 1998, 2004
Portugal 1986, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009,
2011, 2015
Senegal 2007, 2012
Sierra Leone 2012
South Africa 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
South Korea 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012
Spain 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015,
2016
Sri Lanka 1965, 1970, 1977
Sweden 1968, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994,
1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Thailand 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005
Trinidad and Tobago 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2010
Turkey 1965, 1969, 1973, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011,
2015
United Kingdom 1966, 1970, 1974, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001,
2005, 2010, 2015, 2017
United States 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004,
2008, 2012
Uruguay 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
Venezuela 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2000
Zambia 2011
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Table A.2 Summary Statistics of Macro-level Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Incumbent Vote Share 35.653 12.55 0.6 71.2 549
Relative Domestic Growth -0.128 2.499 -11.205 14.119 515
Relative International Growth 0.191 2.124 -11.994 8.346 514
Last 2 year Domestic Growth 3.203 2.819 -10.877 16.943 356
Last 2 year Relative -0.03 3.287 -9.481 18.355 282
Domestic Growth
Last 2 year Relative 0.283 2.788 -16.37 14.853 356
International Growth
Relative Election Year -0.05 3.287 -9.634 17.229 356
Domestic Growth
Relative Election Year 0.248 3.563 -29.262 23.636 363
International Growth
Polarization -2.479 2.116 -7.632 3.72 330
Opponent Strength 29.714 8.826 12.5 50.92 330
Incumbent Position 5.667 1.609 1.053 9.576 365
Opponent Position 5.175 1.927 1.053 9.026 330
International Growth 3.107 1.348 -1.007 7.537 544
Election-year Growth 3.497 3.248 -7.3 20.266 611
Previous Vote Share of 39.418 11.209 8.6 71.2 552
Incumbent
Coalition 0.359 0.48 0 1 529
Effective Number of Parties 3.459 1.55 1.18 10.36 530
Presidential System 0.293 0.456 0 1 532
Last Two Years’ Economic Performance and Incumbent Vote
Here I consider a simpler alternative measure to the relative last two years’ domestic
performance variable. The variable, last two years’ domestic growth, looks to average
GDP growth in only last two years’ of the incumbent’s term without a domestic
comparison.
Table A.3 The Effects of Last Two Years’ Domestic and International Economic
Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model 1 Model 2
Last 2 year Domestic Growth × -0.064**
Last 2 year Relative International Growth (0.031)
Last 2 year Domestic Growth 0.898 0.945
(0.791) (0.763)
Last 2 year Relative International Growth 0.329 0.467
(0.765) (0.774)
International Growth 0.107 0.146
(0.865) (0.855)
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Election-year Growth -0.213 -0.263
(0.198) (0.158)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.661*** 0.677***
(0.098) (0.097)
Coalition 1.062 1.044
(1.437) (1.323)
Effective Number of Parties -1.695*** -1.603***
(0.498) (0.482)
Presidential System -0.358 -0.288
(1.413) (1.380)
Constant 12.291** 11.631**
(4.859) (4.758)
N 319 319
R2 0.485 0.496
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Figure A.1 The Average Marginal Effects of Last Two Years’ Domestic and Interna-
tional Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=319).
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Relative Election-Year Performance and Incumbent Vote
Here I consider another alternative measure to relative domestic and international
performance by assuming that voters only look at the election year performance as
relative to that in the previous election year which is in line with the earlier liter-
ature suggesting that voters reward (punish) incumbents by evaluating the months
or a year before election date (Healy and Lenz 2014, 31). I generate a new vari-
able, relative election-year domestic and international growth. The former takes the
difference in real GDP growth between the election year and the previous election
year. The latter looks at the difference in real GDP growth between the incum-
bent’s election-year and the country’s examined top five export markets in the same
year. In Table A.4 and Figure A.2 we see that these measures have significant ef-
fects on incumbent vote share albeit in lower magnitudes than those of the measures
employed in Table 2.2.
Table A.4 The Effects of Relative Election-year Domestic and International Eco-
nomic Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model 1 Model 2
Relative Election-year Domestic Growth × -0.071**
Relative Election-year International Growth (0.031)
Relative Election Year Domestic Growth -0.439** -0.249
(0.178) (0.172)
Relative Election-year International Growth 0.614* 0.742**
(0.333) (0.314)
International Growth 0.598 0.684
(0.497) (0.498)
Election-year Growth 0.242 0.132
(0.285) (0.268)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.641*** 0.650***
(0.100) (0.099)
Coalition 1.258 1.423
(1.517) (1.439)
Effective Number of Parties -1.826*** -1.786***
(0.502) (0.489)
Presidential System -0.158 -0.165
(1.451) (1.435)
Constant 13.259*** 13.053***
(4.930) (4.837)
N 319 319
R2 0.468 0.483
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure A.2 The Average Marginal Effects of Relative Election-year Domestic and
International Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=319).
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Three-way Interaction of Relative Domestic and International Ecocnomic
Measures and Polarization
Here I consider a three-way interaction of relative domestic and international eco-
nomic performance, and polarization.
Table A.5 The Effects of Relative Election-year Domestic and International Eco-
nomic Growth on Incumbent Vote Share
Incumbent Vote Share Model 1
Polarization × Relative Domestic Growth × 0.026
Relative International Growth (0.030)
Polarization × Relative Domestic Growth 0.006
(0.111)
Relative Domestic Growth × -0.039
Relative International Growth (0.085)
Polarization -0.280**
(0.106)
Relative Domestic Growth 0.297
(0.300)
Relative International Growth 0.756***
(0.221)
Polarization × Relative International Growth 0.068
(0.071)
Opponent Strength -0.063
(0.056)
International Growth 0.559*
(0.302)
Election-year Growth 0.007
(0.100)
Previous Vote of Incumbent 0.669***
(0.075)
Coalition -0.313
(1.078)
Effective Number of Parties -1.711***
(0.538)
Presidential System 3.812
(3.392)
Constant 15.502**
(5.964)
N 298
R2 0.717
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure A.3 The Average Marginal Effect of Polarization on Incumbent Vote Share
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calculated from conditional standard errors (N=319).
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APPENDIX B
Table B.1 Summary Statistics of Individual-level Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Incumbent Vote 0.493 0.5 0 1 1717
Economic Evaluations 2.316 1.349 1 5 2071
Incumbent Partisanship 0.527 0.499 0 1 1567
Degree of Partisanship 1.537 0.554 1 3 1522
Ideological Distance 3.09 2.418 0.44 8.5 1865
Perceived Ideological Distance 3.023 2.988 0 10 1762
Education 2.189 1.279 0 6 2132
Religiosity 4.64 1.801 1 6 1987
Income 2.949 1.428 1 5 1809
Gender 0.521 0.5 0 1 2137
Age 39.985 14.964 17 90 2130
Language 0.092 0.289 0 1 2120
Urban Residence 0.43 0.495 0 1 2137
Election-year 2016.475 1.5 2015 2018 2137
Table B.2 The Effects of Economic Evaluations and Ideological Distance on Incum-
bent Vote in the 2015 and 2018 General Elections
Incumbent Vote Model 1
2018 Election=1× Economic Evaluations × 0.125
Ideological Distance (0.154)
Economic Evaluations × Ideological Distance 0.202*
(0.106)
2018 Election=1× Economic Evaluations -0.078
(0.395)
2018 Election=1 × Ideological Distance -0.338
(0.485)
Economic Evaluations -0.369
(0.270)
Ideological Distance -0.846***
(0.327)
2018 Election=1 0.491
(1.260)
Incumbent Partisanship 5.510***
(0.484)
Degree of Partisanship -0.656
78
(0.586)
Incumbent Partisanship × Degree of Partisanship 1.904**
(0.785)
Education -0.169
(0.183)
Religiosity 0.132
(0.108)
Income 0.109
(0.139)
Gender -0.247
(0.374)
Age 0.001
(0.061)
Age2 -0.000
(0.001)
Language -0.187
(0.909)
Urban Residence -0.156
(0.364)
Constant -0.937
(1.650)
N 1062
Pseudo-R2 0.806
Log-likelihood -142.912
AIC 323.823
BIC 418.213
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Perceived Ideological Distance and The Effect of Economic Evaluations
on Incumbent Vote
Figure B.1 The Average Marginal Effect of Economic Evaluations on Incumbent
Vote for Incumbent Partisans
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=1023).
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Figure B.2 The Average Marginal Effect of Perceived Ideological Distance on In-
cumbent Vote accross the in-sample Range of Economic Evaluations
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=1023).
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Figure B.3 The Average Marginal Effect of Economic Evaluations on Incumbent
Vote for Other Party Partisans
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=1023).
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Figure B.4 The Average Marginal Effect of Economic Evaluations on Incumbent
Vote for Weak Party Partisans in the Two Elections
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Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effect
calculated from conditional standard errors (N=1023).
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